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Indian agriculture today is under a large crisis. An average farmer household’s 
returns from cultivation would be around one thousand rupees per month. The 
incomes are inadequate and the farmer is not in a position to address the multitude of 
risks: weather, credit, market and technology among others. Social responsibility of 
education, healthcare and marriage instead of being normal activities add to the 
burden. All these would even put the semi-medium farmer under a state of transient 
poverty. The state of the vast majority of small and marginal farmers and agricultural 
labourers is worse off. An extreme form of response to this crisis is the increasing 
incidence of farmers’ suicides.  In such situations, employment programmes can 
provide some succour to the agricultural labourers and also perhaps to the marginal 
and small farmers. The least that one can expect from such programmes is rent-
seeking. Some recent evidences indicate that one can develop institutions to address 
this. It is this that gives a glimmer of hope in the larger story of distress, despair and 
death. 
 
Incidentally, this paper provides some estimates from National Sample Survey (NSS) 
region wise information on returns to cultivation and on some aspects of farmers’ 
indebtedness based on the 33
rd schedule 59
th round survey of 2003. It provides suicide 
mortality rate for farmers, non-farmers and age-adjusted population across states of 
India from 1995-2004. 
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programmes, value of output in agriculture 
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1 This has been prepared as a keynote paper on the theme “Post-reform Crisis in Indian Agriculture” 
for presentation at the 39
th Annual Conference of the Orissa Economic Association, January 13-14, 
2007, U.N.S. Mahavidyalaya, Mugpal, Jajpur, Orissa. It is also meant to be a background paper for the 
ongoing book project on ‘Agrarian Crisis in India’ and the concurrent exercise on ‘Agricultural 
Indebtedness’ undertaken at IGIDR. The author thanks Manoj Panda, R. Radhakrishna, D. Narasimha 
Reddy and V. M. Rao for comments and discussion on related issues, EPWRF for providing some raw 
data on value of output in agriculture and C. S. Mishra for providing provisional data on suicides for 
2004. Usual disclaimers apply. 
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Agrarian Scenario in Post-reform India: 





In recent years, the growth of the Indian economy at about eight per cent per annum is 
considered as a success of the reform process initiated in the 1990s. This is 
analogously called as the rise of the Indian elephant which, of course, is different 
from the Chinese dragon. Is this poetic phrase justified; or, is it a satire? The grace 
and beauty in the elephants stride seems to be missing – “India shines, but Bharat 
falters.” The impressive growth in recent years is largely a story of the urban-based 
service sector and to a lesser extent for industry whereas agriculture is lagging behind. 
Today, agriculture accounts for less than one-fourth of the gross domestic produce but 
employs nearly three-fifths of the total work force. Within agriculture, the incremental 
value addition in output indicates a shift away from traditional crops to high value 
crops like fruits & vegetables that hardly have any presence under the gross cropped 
area. The growth of the cereals, propelled largely by rice and wheat through the green 
revolution, is also not very encouraging in the recent past.  
 
Overall, income from cultivation is inadequate. It becomes difficult for the farmer to 
plan for all possible risks: vagaries of nature (primarily, inadequate or excessive 
water), market related uncertainties such as increasing input costs and output price 
shocks, unavailability of credit from institutional sources or excessive reliance on 
informal sources with a greater interest burden and new technology among others. 
With the decline in extension service he has to rely on the input dealer leading to 
supplier-induced-demand. This has adverse implications on the livelihoods of the 
cultivators, most of whom are marginal and small farmers, as well as for agricultural 
labourers. This is indicative of a larger agrarian crisis. Response to the crisis would be 
different among different sub-groups and vary across different regions. One of the 
extreme forms of reaction is reflected through the increasing incidence of farmers’ 
suicides. If the state of farmers is critical then that of the agricultural labourers would 
be worse off. 
 
In this paper we further elaborate about the changing agrarian scenario, increasing 
incidence of farmers’ suicides and also on some public policy interventions with 
regard to employment programmes in sections 2-4 respectively. Concluding remarks 
are in section 5. 
 
2. Changes in Agrarian Conditions
2
Agriculture’s contribution to the gross domestic produce in India has reduced from 56 
per cent in 1950-51 to 23 per cent in 2005-06 whereas as per the 2001 census 58 per 
cent of the total work force and 73 per cent of the rural workers are still dependent on 
agriculture. This also indicates that rural non-farm employment opportunities are 
limited. Between 1960-61 and 2002-03, the number of agricultural operational 
holdings in rural India during Kharif nearly doubled from 53 million to 102 million. 
                                                 
2 For some recent discussions on the agrarian crisis see Rao and Gopalappa (2004), Mohanty (2005), 
Reddy (2006), Reddy and Mishra (2006), Vaidyanathan (2006) and Vyas (2004) among others. 
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Composition across size-class after including landless indicates that large (above 10 
hectares), medium (4-10 hectares) and semi-medium (2-4 hectares) categories have 
been declining from the 1960s, small (1-2 hectares) size-class started declining from 
the 1970s with absolute numbers declining in the 1990s, marginal (0.002-1 hectares) 
size-class declined in the 1990s with absolute numbers increasing from 45 million in 
1990-91 to 48 million in 2002-03 and nil (0-0.002 hectares) category which declined 
from 27 per cent in 1970-71 to 22 per cent in 1990-91 has increased to 32 per cent in 
2002-03 (National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 2006).  After excluding 
Jammu & Kashmir and Manipur the census figures indicate that from 1991 to 2001 
the total number of cultivators remained around 125 million whereas that of 
agricultural labourers increased from 86 million to 106 million. In short, the 
dependence on agriculture is increasingly among the ranks of agricultural labourers 
and marginal farmers. 
 
In the 1990s (1990-91 to 1999-2000) the index of farm income remained around 100 
whereas consumer price index of agricultural labourers more than doubled from 100 
to 219 and this has led to widening disparities between agricultural and non-
agricultural income (Reddy 2006). The index of agricultural production increased 
from 100 at triennium ending 1981-82 to 170 in the triennium ending 2003-04 
(Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 2005). Comparing trends in growth rate in production, 
area and yield in the 1980s (TE 1981-82 to TE 1992-93) and 1990s (TE 1993-94 to 
TE 2004-05) for major crop groups one observes that the growth rates have been 
significantly lower in production and this is largely because of the lower growth rates 
is yield for most of the crop groups (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Growth Rate of Production, Area and Yield (Per cent per Annum): 
Comparing 1980s and 1990s 
Crops Production  Area  Yield 
  1980s   1990s     1980s   1990s   1980s   1990s    
Total Foodgrains  3.0 *  1.0 *  #  -0.3 * -0.3 *  3.3 *  1.3 *  #
  Total Cereals  3.2 *  1.2 *  #  -0.3 * -0.2 *  3.5 *  1.4 *  #
    Rice  3.8 *  0.9 *  #  0.6 * 0.2     3.2 *  0.6 *  #
    Wheat  4.0 *  1.9 *  #  0.7 * 0.8 *  3.2 *  1.1 *  #
    Coarse Cereals  0.6   0.1     -2.0 * -1.7 *  2.6 *  1.9 *   
  Pulses  1.5 *  -0.5   #  -0.1   -0.6 *  1.6 *  0.1   #
Total Oilseeds  6.6 *  0.0   #  3.7 * -0.9 *  # 3.0 *  0.9 *  #
Sugarcane  3.9 *  1.4 *  #  2.1 * 1.6 *  1.8 *  -0.2   #
Cottn (Lint)  4.2 *  0.3   #  0.2   1.4 *  4.0 *  -1.0   #
Jute & Mesta  0.9 *  2.2 *    -1.8 * 0.8   # 2.8 *  1.4 *  #
Note: Growth rate has been calculated using kinked exponential method, ln (Yt) =a+b(dt+(1-
d)k)+c((1-d)(t-k)+et; t=0,…T denotes time, d is a dummy variable (d=1 for sub-period period 1 of 
1980s from triennium ending (TE) 1981-2 to TE 1992-93 and d=0 for sub-period 2 of 1990s from TE 
1993-94 to TE 2004-05), k=12 is the breakpoint at TE 1993-94. The years TE 1981-82 and TE 1993-
94 are taken as start and breakpoints because they are considered as base periods for agricultural 
purposes and would help us compare between these two periods.  * indicates that the growth rate for 
that period is significantly different from zero at 95% CI and # indicates that the growth rate between 
the two periods are significantly different at 95 per cent CI.  
Source: Computed from data given in RBI (2005) 
 
Using slightly different periodization, Singh (2006) observes similar differences in the 
annual compound growth rates for the two periods. He also indicates that in the 1980s 
  4 
 
the growth in value of output per hectare at 2.2 per cent per annum was slightly higher 
than costs 1.8 per cent per annum whereas in the 1990s the growth in value of output 
at 0.9 per cent per annum was lower than that of costs at 1.2 per cent per annum and 
as a result farm business income in recent years has not increased much. Incremental 
value addition in agriculture (TE 2002-03 over TE 1992-93) shows a shift towards 
high value addition crops like fruits and vegetables (Appendix 1). A calculation for 
Maharashtra indicates that increase in value of output in recent years is largely for 
fruits and vegetables that account for less than 5 per cent of the gross cropped area. 
Evidence from Telengana, Andhra Pradesh indicate that between 1986-2000 real 
agricultural output growth is significant whereas at the same time there have been 
significant welfare declines not only for agricultural labourers and marginal farmers, 
but also for other groups; growth and distress seem to be intertwined 
(Vakulabharanam 2005).   
 
In 2002-03, the average returns from cultivation per hectare in India are Rs.6756/- in 
Kharif and Rs.9290 in Rabi (Appendix 2). From the total farmer households, 86 per 
cent with an average land size of 1.2 hectares in Kharif and 62 per cent with an 
average land size of 0.9 hectare in Rabi had cultivated. Paid out expenses as per cent 
of value of output is about 44 per cent in Kharif and 42 per cent in Rabi. This is likely 
to be higher if one includes imputed family labour or rent on account of own land. 
Besides, some pattern could be hidden because the calculations are aggregated across 
all crops. There is wide inter-state variation. Compared to the national average, one 
observes relatively lower returns per hectare and greater share of expenses in the 
states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu during Kharif. This could be indicative of 
high costs or crop failure. Share of expenses to the value of output is less than 30 per 
cent in most of the hilly states: Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, 
the Northeast states and Uttaranchal indicating that dependence on market based 
inputs could be much lower here.  
 
Average returns from cultivation is Rs.11,259/- per annum (Table 2).
3 About 60 per 
cent and 10 per cent of farmer households obtain some returns from farm animals and 
non-farm business respectively and the monthly returns from these per farmer 
households are Rs.85/- and Rs.236/- respectively. In addition, farmer households will 
also get income from wages and salaries. As expected, returns per household 
increases with land size. Average family size also increases with land size indicating 
that the increase in per capita returns would not be as large. Across caste groups, 
scheduled castes (SCs, who generally own the marginal lands) have the least returns 
and above them are scheduled tribes and from both these groups the other backward 
castes fare better, but the returns for all these three groups is lower than the overall 
average. Overall, there is not much diversification and the income of an average 
farmer household from cultivation would hardly suffice to meet some basic day-to-
day requirements.  
 
                                                 
3 Value of output in agriculture in constant 1993-94 prices was lower in 2002-03 in comparison with 
the previous year by about 12 per cent. To account for this if one increases the returns from cultivation 
by one-third then also it would be less than Rs.15,000/- per annum. Given a family size of 5.5 the per 
capita per day returns from cultivation turn out to be less than Rs.8/-. Under such scenario, other 
sources become necessary if the farmer household has to stay above the poverty line. 
  5 
 
Table 2 























































Land size        
Near  landless  9.9 367 462 125 339  5.0 
Marginal  55.6 3243 2667  88  223  5.2 
Small  18.1 8098 5922  100  181  5.7 
Semi-Medium  10.6 13880 10596  69  188  6.2 
Medium  4.8 22841 20940  75  422  6.9 
Large  0.9 33494 34600  122  507  7.5 
Caste        
SC  17.4 3123 2693  23  213  5.4 
ST  13.3 6256 2746  79  138  5.3 
OBC  41.5 5237 5044  92  238  5.6 
Others  27.6 9559 7695  140  293  5.5 
Like farming as a profession        
No  40.1 4156 3337  71  263  5.5 
Yes  59.5 7606 6237  103  213  5.5 
Total  100.0 6200 5059  85  236  5.5 
Note: HH=Household, Rs=Indian Rupees. Near landless=0-0.099 hectares (ha), Marginal=0.1-1 ha, 
Small=1.001-2, Semi-Medium=2.001-4 ha, Medium=4.001-10 ha, Large>10 ha. Information on caste 
and whether they like farming as a profession was not available for 0.1 per cent and 0.4 per cent 
respectively. Returns to Kharif and Rabi are calculated by subtracting paid out expenses from the 
value of output, which includes by-products. It does not include family labour or rent for own land. 
Returns from farm animals and non-farm business are calculated based on 30 day recall. The farmer 
households will also have other sources of income like wages and salaries. 
Source: Calculated from unit level data using 33
rd schedule, 59
th round of National Sample Survey 
(NSS) on Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers. 
 
At a time when one would require greater inputs from the state, it seems to be 
withdrawing. This is evident from decline in public investment, in the reduced role of 
formal credit institutions and poor extension service among others. We elaborate on 
these. Gross fixed capital formation in agriculture as a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) declined from 3.1 per cent during 1980-85 (Sixth plan) to 1.6 per cent 
during 1997-2002 (Ninth plan) in 1993-94 prices (Table 3). During the same period, 
gross fixed capital formation in agriculture as a proportion of total gross fixed capital 
formation declined from 13.1 per cent to 7.4 per cent and proportion of plan 
expenditure towards agriculture & allied activities declined from 6.1 per cent to 4.5 
per cent.  
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Table 3 
Capital Formation and Plan Expenditure in Agriculture 
Year  GFCF in Agr as % 
of GDP, India 
GFCF in Agr as % 
of total GFCF, India
Exp on Agr & 
Allied as % of total 
Plan Exp, India 
1980-85, Sixth Plan (Actuals)  3.1  13.1  6.1 
1985-92, Seventh Plan (Actuals)  2.3  9.6  5.9 
1992-97, Eighth Plan (Actuals)  1.9  7.4  5.1 
1997-2002, Ninth Plan (Actuals)  1.6  7.4  4.5 
Note: GFCF indicates Gross Fixed Capital Formation, GDP indicates Gross Domestic Product at 
Factor Cost, Exp indicates expenditure, Agr indicates Agriculture. 
Source: Mishra (2006a). 
 
In recent years, using 1999-2000 prices one observes that gross fixed capital 
formation in agriculture has declined from 2.2 per cent in 1999-2000 to 1.7 per cent in 
a quick estimate of 2004-05. The demand and use of water in domestic consumption 
(particularly, in urban areas) is also on the rise. These have an adverse impact on 
irrigation and consequently on availability of water for agricultural purposes. In other 
words, it is the marginal and small farmers who bear the brunt of unavailability of 
water and its associated yield uncertainty. 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s the banking industry through affirmative measures led to 
deployment of credit in agricultural sector. As a result, the scheduled commercial 
banks share of credit to agriculture increased from 9 per cent in December 1972 to 
nearly 18 per cent by December 1987 and thereafter the share of agricultural credit 
declined. The increase in 1970s and 1980s was largely realized through the 
earmarking of credit for priority sector lending and that too through direct advances. 
Over time, there was some dilution as it allowed for achieving one-fourth of the target 
in the form of indirect advances. Despite this, both direct and indirect credit declined 
to 11 per cent by March 2004.  Concurrently, the number of agricultural loan accounts 
in scheduled commercial banks that had reached a peak of 27.7 million by March 
1992 declined to 20.3 million by March 2002 and is at 21.3 million by March 2004 
(Shetty 2006). 
 
The Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers of 2003 (NSS 59
th round) indicates that 
nearly 49 per cent of farmer households are indebted with the average outstanding 
amount per indebted farmer household being Rs.25902/-. The states with a higher 
average outstanding amount of indebtedness are Andhra Pradesh, Chandigarh, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Pondicherry, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu (Figure 1). These are 
also the states with a relatively higher proportion of farmer households indebted, and 
hence, amount outstanding per farmer household is also higher than the all India 
average in all these states expect for Himachal Pradesh (Appendix 3). 
 
Purpose wise distribution indicates that nearly 58 per cent of outstanding debt is for 
agricultural purpose (31 per cent capital expenditure and 28 per cent current 
expenditure), 7 per cent for non-farm business and the remaining 35 per cent is for 
consumption or other purposes (NSSO 2005). The states with relatively higher 
proportion of outstanding debt for current expenditure are Andhra Pradesh, 
Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Meghalaya and Punjab. Some of the 
Northeast states and other hilly states indicated that more than 10 per cent of the 
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outstanding debt was for non-farm business; of course the amount of outstanding debt 
in these states was much lower. One exception is Himachal Pradesh where amount of 
outstanding debt is higher and 29 per cent of the outstanding debt is for non-farm 
business.  
 

























































































Note: AN=Andaman & Nicobal Islands, AP=Andhra Pradesh, AR=Arunachal Pradesh, AS=Assam, 
BI=Bihar,  CH=Chattishgarh, CN=Chandigarh, DD=Daman & Diu, DE=Delhi, DN=Dadra &  Nagar 
Haveli, GO=Goa, GU=Gujarat, HA=Haryana, HP=Himachal Pradesh, IN=India, JH=Jharkhand, 
JK=Jammu & Kashmir, KA=Karnataka, KE=Kerlal, LA=Lakshadweep, MA=Maharashtra, 
ME=Meghalaya, MI=Mizoram, MN=Manipur, MP=Madhya Pradesh, NA=Nagalan, OR=Orissa, 
PO=Pondicherry, PU=Punjab, RA=Rajasthan, SI=Sikkim, TN=Tamil Nadu, TR=Tripura,  UP=Uttar 
Pradesh, UT=Uttaranchal, WB=West Bengal. 
Source: Calculated from unit level data using 33
rd schedule, 59
th round of National Sample Survey 
(NSS) on Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers. 
 
Source wise distribution suggests that 58 per cent are from formal sources 
(Government 2.5 per cent, Cooperatives 19.6 per cent and Banks 35.6 per cent); more 
than one-fourth of the outstanding debt is from moneylenders and the rest from other 
informal sources. The states with relatively higher proportion from moneylenders are 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Manipur, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. The proportion 
from moneylenders as well as other informal sources is much lower in Maharashtra 
where more than half of the loan is from Cooperatives and more than one-third from 
Banks. Nearly 70 per cent of the outstanding amount is from loans that are more than 
a year old, that is, they are carried over from earlier agricultural seasons. This is 
nearly three-fourths is Maharashtra with 84 per cent of these being from formal 
sources. When we consider the small and marginal farmers then the share of 
outstanding amount from formal sources is less than 25 per cent. This is of concern 
because 84 per cent of all farmer households are from this category. These are 
indicative of a huge unmet demand and as a consequence, a substantial amount of 
current loans is likely to be from informal sources. Field survey observations in 
western Vidarbha of Maharashtra indicates that from the outstanding debt of loans 
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taken in 2004 nearly 72 per cent for suicide case households and about 38 per cent for 
control households are from informal sources.  
 
The farmer is increasingly dependent on the market for inputs. Usage of seeds from 
own produce are being replaced by hybrid varieties and now with the costlier 
genetically modified varieties (particularly, in Cotton). Farmers are led into situations 
where they have to use greater and greater dosage of fertilizers to maintain 
productivity. Spraying of pesticides has increased over years as the pests develop 
immunity, but they also have an adverse effect by killing the friendly pests. With new 
inputs there is a change in technology of cultivation. The farmers existing knowledge 
becomes redundant; there is deskilling. In the absence of professional extension 
service, the farmers are dependent on advice from input dealers leading to supplier-
induced-demand. There have been instances of villages opting for a second/third 
sowing during deficient rainfall years without any dependence on irrigation or even 
ground water. Besides overuse, usage of spurious varieties of inputs is also a matter of 
serious concern. Situations where seed sown have led to healthy growth of the plant 
but do not yield any produce lead to a suspicion that genetically modified terminator 
seeds are being sold under cover. 
 
Case study of a farmer owning eight acres of unirrigated land in Yavatmal suggests 
the following. In 2004, he cultivated cotton in five acres where he had to go in for a 
second sowing due to delay in rain. This has led to an increase in seed expenses, but 
the expenses incurred in the second instance was reduced by half by going in for a 
different variety and using some left over seeds.
4 The total expenditure on seed was 
Rs.7500/-. After including expenditure on fertilizer (Rs.5000/-), pesticides (Rs.3000/-) 
and labour (Rs.2000/-) his total costs are Rs.17500/-. He got a produce of 15 quintals, 
which he sold to the Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing 
Federation (MSCCGMF) through the monopoly cotton procurement scheme (MCPS). 
At the time of survey, he had received Rs.1500/- per quintal and was expecting 
another Rs.500/- per quintal. After receiving this balance amount his net income will 
be Rs.12500/-. The remaining three acres, used for cultivating crops for consumption 
purposes, under a deficient rain did not give much return. A good crop (say, 4 quintals 
of Cotton per acre) would have taken this farmer above the poverty line, but now he is 
below the poverty line.
5 This depicts that the transient state of poverty of even a semi-
medium farmer household. The situation would be worse for marginal/small farmers 
who are likely to have lower access to credit from formal sources. A tenant farmer 
will also have additional costs in the form of rent. Further, because of lower volumes 
of produce or immediate cash requirement or non-legal status of tenancy they may 
end up selling the produce to traders at lower then the price prevailing in market 
centres. A slight dip in the price of produce will also have an adverse affect on their 
income.  
   
                                                 
4 It is generally the case that in an acre of land one packet of seeds (910 grams) that costs around 
Rs.450/- to Rs.500/- for non-Bt varieties and Rs.1600/- for legal Bt varieties would suffice (in 2006-07 
agricultural season, due to a court judgement price of legal Bt varieties have come down to about 
Rs.1250/- per packet). However, due to a guaranteed germination rate of 65 per cent only, farmers end 
up sowing two instead of one seed and thereby increasing the seed requirement. Under assured water, 
such practices might reduce.  
5 Updating the Planning Commission poverty line for rural Maharashtra to 2004 one gets an income of 
Rs.4037/- per person per annum (that is, Rs.336.45 per capita per month). 
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Opening up of the economy has led to certain cash crops like Cotton and Pepper 
among others being exposed to greater price volatility. Excess international supply of 
Cotton at a lower price is also because of direct and indirect subsidies leading to 
dumping by the USA. Domestic policies in India have led to removal of quantitative 
restrictions and subsequently reduction of import tariff from 35 per cent in 2001-02 to 
5 per cent in 2002-03 increasing our vulnerability to the volatility of international 
prices. It is at this critical juncture when there is a greater need of price stabilization 
that the monopoly cotton procurement scheme (MCPS) of Maharashtra has become 
non-functional. Disbanding of this scheme in 2005-06 has in fact led to a reduction of 
Rs.500/- per quintal advance additional price that has in recent years acted as a 
cushion against the higher costs in the state. The commission for agricultural costs 
and prices estimates the cost of production for cotton in Maharashtra at Rs.2303/- per 
quintal, but the all India minimum support price for the long staple variety of fair 
average quality is only Rs.1980/-. 
 
The larger agrarian crisis has an adverse affect on farm households. A symptom of 
this crisis is reflected in the increasing incidence of farmers' suicides. 
 
3. Farmers’ Suicides in India
6
In recent years, farmers’ suicides in India have attracted wide media, public policy 
and scholarly attention. In India, there have been 156,562 farmer suicides during 
1995-2004. From these, more than four-fifths are males. The suicide mortality rate 
(SMR, suicide death per 100,000 persons) for male farmers nearly doubled in ten 
years from 9.7 in 1995 to 19.2 in 2004. SMR for male non-farmers has veered around 
13; it increased from 12.6 in 1995 to 14.2 in 1999 and then decreased to 13.4 in 2004 
(Figure 2).
7 Conditions should be created such that the possibilities of committing 
suicide should be reduced. Suicide being a rare event, relatively higher incidence 
among a sub-group could be indicative of a larger socio-economic malaise. For every 
individual committing suicide, there could be many more in a state of despair. 
Inclusive development should address the larger crisis. 
                                                 
6 Some related discussions are in Mishra (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d and 2006e). 
7 The SMR estimates of 2004 are based on provisional data. On the method used for calculating SMRs 
see Mishra (2006c). For trends in SMR for farmers, non-farmers and age-adjusted general population 
from 1995 to 2004 see Appendix 4. 
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Figure 2: SMR for Male Farmers and Male Non-







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Male Farmers Male Non-farmers
 
Note: SMR for farmers are based on interpolated/extrapolated population for cultivators using 1991 
and 2001 census. For details, see Mishra (2006c). 
Source: National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) (Various Years). 
 
In 2004, the states/union territories with SMR for male farmers higher than the 
national average are Andhra Pradesh (44.5), Goa (32.1), Karnataka (35.4), Kerala 
(183.0), undivided Madhya Pradesh (27.7) Maharashtra (57.2), Sikkim (40.5), Tamil 
Nadu (43.7), Dadra & Nagar Haveli (42.5), Delhi (49.4) and Pondicherry (1495.4).
8 
Together these states account for nearly four-fifth of farmer suicides in 2004, more 
than half from the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, 
another one-fourth from undivided Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and the 
remaining five smaller states/union territories contributing for a little more than one 
per cent. As indicated earlier, higher farmers’ suicide is symptomatic of a larger 
agrarian crisis. Some of the systemic risks (faced by a large number of households) 
have been discussed in the previous section.  
 
Now, we take up discussion on idiosyncratic factors based on field survey in western 
Vidarbha, Maharashtra. From the 111 suicide cases analyzed, 91 per cent were males, 
55 per cent in the age group of 31-50 years, and 80 per cent were currently married, 
nearly 40 per cent were matriculates or with higher education, 58 per cent had more 
than 10 years of experience. The size-class of land shows that 53 per cent were 
marginal and small farmers with less than 5 acres of land. 
 
Analysis of suicide case household indicates that on average 4.8 risk factors were 
identified per case. Some of the socio-economic risk factors identified are 
indebtedness (87 per cent), deterioration of economic status (74 per cent, conflict with 
other members in the family (55 per cent), crop failure (41 per cent), decline in social 
position (36 per cent), burden of daughter’s/sister’s marriage (34 per cent), suicide in 
a nearby village (32 per cent), addictions (28 per cent), change in behaviour of 
                                                 
8 The high SMR among farmers in Pondicherry is because of their low population, less then 10000 
were cultivators as per 2001 census.  
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deceased (26 per cent), dispute with neighbours/others (23 per cent), health problem 
(21 per cent), a recent death in the family (10 per cent), history of suicide in the 
family (6 per cent) and other family members being ill (4 per cent). These factors are 
not mutually exclusive. They can co-exist and are also interrelated such that they can 
feed into each other and aggravate each other (see case studies in Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Cases of Suicide Death by Farmers in Vidarbha 
Case A: 45 years male. The household has 6 acres of land and has an annual 
income of Rs.35000/-. Discussion revealed that: (i) delayed monsoon led to 
double/triple sowing increasing input costs for the household (ii) the deceased 
individual had entered into cotton trading for which he had taken loans and 
invested on other farmers and as a result the impact of crop failure by other farmers 
would also add to his burden, (iii) the individual had plans of getting at least one of 
his daughters married, (iv) he was also contemplating of contesting the local 
Sarpanch elections indicating that any economic downfall would effect his social 
reputation immensely. From this case one can infer that there is a complex 
interplay of multiple causes that are not mutually exclusive. After the demise of 
this individual there were three/four cases in nearby villages in about 7-10 days. 
This suggests a cascading effect. People from neighbouring villages who also had 
their own problems could relate to someone who is also a peasant like them. 
 
Case B: A young man in his early 20s. Few years ago his father was not well and 
he took over the reigns of cultivation and experimented with input intensive 
cultivation. From the returns he could spend on father’s treatment, expenses on a 
sister’s marriage and improved the overall economic condition of the household. 
Other farmers also started taking advice from him. He was confident of a good 
crop and initiated plans for getting the other sister married. He had also told his 
mother that he would like to get married to a girl from a poorer household without 
taking any dowry. To his dismay, the crop failed …   
 
Case C: 52 years, male. They had 52 acres of land at one time, but now they have 
36 acres only – indicating a scenario where economic position is declining. The 
individual had outstanding loan from formal as well as informal sources and a 
couple of days before the fateful incident, the private moneylender had visited and 
insisted on being returned the money or transferring ownership of some land. 
There were two daughters of marriageable age. There was a burden on higher 
education of his children. The deceased had been talking some time ago with his 
children about other suicide cases and given his opinion that that is no solution; 
this perhaps gives a faint indication that he might have been contemplating suicide 
for some time. 
  
In 79 per cent of the cases, suicide was committed by consuming pesticides. This 
brings into the question of easy accessibility of a lethal toxic element. A hospital that 
can treat emergencies like poisoning is on an average more than 20 kilometers away – 
this limits the access to care. 
 
Comparing suicide cases with non-suicide controls, on an average the former have an 
outstanding debt that is 3.5 times higher per household (Rs.38444/- compared to 
Rs.10910). Even after normalizing by family size and land size the outstanding debt 
in suicide case households is nearly three times higher. The former have relatively 
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lower ownership of assets and access to basic amenities - (particularly, bullocks a 
productive and liquid asset is owned by 43 per cent of suicide case households 
compared to 64 per cent of non-suicide control households). Average family size in 
suicide case households at 5.53 is greater than that of non-suicide control households 
at 5.08. The greater family size is particularly true for the number of female members. 
The average value of produce per suicide case households at Rs.23 thousand is about 
55 per cent of the average value of produce per non-suicide control households. The 
case-control analysis points to greater hardship among suicide case households. 
 
A statistical exercise is done to compare case-control households. Households suicide 
status is a binary dependent variable, Y; 1=case and 0=control. The independent 
variables, Xi’s, are outstanding debt in rupees, a yes/no binary variable on ownership 
of bullocks, outstanding debt per acre in rupees, family size and value of produce per 





where ln is natural logarithm, p is probability of obtaining a suicide case household, 
ln[p/(1p)] is the log odds ratio of a suicide case household, α is a coefficient on the 
constant term, βi’s are the coefficients of the independent variables, Xi’s, and u is 
error term.  
 
While discussing results, instead of coefficients, odds ratio, e
βi, are given because the 
interpretation is more intuitive – for a unit increase in the independent variable there 
would be a corresponding change in the odds ratio (probability of a suicide 
case/probability of a non-suicide control). 
 
The result for complete case-control analysis of the 68 pairs of observation is as 
follows. It gives outstanding debt and absence of bullocks as statistically significant 
variables that differentiate suicide case from non-suicide control households (Table 
4). It suggests that if outstanding debt increases by Rs.1000 then the odds that the 
household is one with a suicide victim increases by 6 per cent and if the household 
owns bullocks then the odds that it is a household with a suicide victim decreases by 
65 per cent. Under other restrictions, that is, by controlling for land size, caste or 
district we also observe that family size and value of produce are significant in 
explaining differences between suicide case and non-suicide control households. 
 
                                                 
9 In the step-wise procedure, a variable is added if it increases chi-square significance by 0.05 and it is 
dropped if it increases chi-square significance by 0.1. 
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Table 4 
Results (Odds Ratio) of Stepwise Logistic Regression Analysis 





Same Caste  Yavatmal 
District 
N 136  110  70  80 
Debt 1.000061      1.000055 
 (0.0000138)   (0.0000176) 
 [0.000]      [0.002] 
Own Bullocks   0.3462934    .2092665  0.3084751 
 (0.1403603) (.1139936)  (0.1685215) 
 [0.009]    [0.004]  [0.031] 
Debt per Acre    1.000325     
 (.0000776)    
   [0.000]     
Family Size    1.352608   
 (.2021914)   
     [0.043]   
Value per Acre        0.9997575 
       (0.0001234) 
       [0.049] 
Log Likelihood  -74.6497  -61.682649  -
42.619212 
-42.176024 
LR Chi2  39.24  29.13  11.80  26.55 
Prob >Chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0027  0.0000 
PseudoR2 0.2081  0.1910  0.1216  0.2394 
Note: Round brackets give standard error, square brackets give prob > |z|. The variables 
are indicated in the order in which they were selected in the step-wise logistic regression. 
Source: Mishra (2006a) 
 
There are a couple of points on the administrative or legal dimensions. First, as per 
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 309, attempt to suicide is considered a criminal act.  This 
negates the thinking that a suicide victim requires psychosocial care. Call for a 
humane perspective warrants that suicide be first decriminalized. A court ruling is 
also of a similar view, but without appropriate legislative backing the statute remains. 
Second, on the eligibility of surviving members of suicide victim being compensated, 
the administration has to deal with two errors: first, not to exclude genuine cases; and 
second, not to compensate undeserving cases. Both errors ought to be minimized but 
they are also related in the sense that reducing one would increase the other. 
Conventionally, prudent accounting norms on money to be spent have attuned the 
administration towards reducing the latter kind of error, whereas from a welfare 
perspective reducing the former error is more appropriate. Third, there have been 
some positive legal interventions. It is at the behest of the Bombay High Court that 
Tata Institute of Social Science came up with a report (Dandekar et al 2005). More 
recently, the Supreme Court has asked the Government of India to review its 
agricultural policies. A petition by the Government of Andhra Pradesh has led to 
another recent court ruling in favour of reducing the high royalty charged for the 
genetically modified varieties of cotton.  
 
The larger agrarian crisis is a matter of serious concern. At this critical juncture when 
there is need for greater support, the state seems to be withdrawing: public investment 
is declining, formal sources of credit are not adequate and research and extension is 
lacking. As a corollary, private investment in the form of digging more and more 
wells has ended up in the tragedy of commons, informal sources of credit are more 
costly and the farmer depends on the input dealers for advice leading to supplier-
induced demand. The idiosyncratic factors point out a pattern that suicide case 
  14 
 
households when compared with the non-suicide control households have  a higher 
outstanding debt, lower ownership of assets (particularly, bullocks a productive and 
liquid asset), a higher family size (particularly, female members) and a lower value of 
produce. Agriculture-based income is inadequate for the small or even semi-medium 
farmers. This would be further accentuated because of low yield, poor prices, high 
input costs or additional expenses (health, wards education or daughter’s marriage). If 
the situation of the small farmer is precarious then that of the marginal farmer or the 
agricultural labourer would be even worse. For these groups, alternative employment 
opportunities could provide some additional income. 
 
4. Public Policy Interventions for Employment 
Keeping the inclusive development perspective in mind this study will elaborate on 
two livelihood related aspects. They are: the pressing problem of farmers’ suicides, 
which is symptomatic of a larger agrarian crisis; and public policy interventions for 
employment, which assumes importance with the recently enacted National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), 2005. 
 
After enactment of NREGA, the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) has been in 
operation in more than 180 districts from 2 February 2006. As per the Act, failure to 
provide employment within 15 days after seeking employment will lead to an 
entitlement allowance: one-fourth of the prescribed wage rate for the first 30 days and 
one-half of it for any additional days. As these have been recently commenced, we 
will discuss our observations based on an evaluation of the Sampoorna Grameen 
Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) (Panda et al, 2005), an earlier employment programme prior 
to the guarantee, and also draw on some other related work. 
 
Even before the NREGA, entitlement to employment has been in force in 
Maharashtra since 1979. Under the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MEGS) there was a provision of a monetary compensation of Rs.2/- per day if the 
state government failed to provide employment within two weeks. The MEGS has 
been cited as a major programme in the debate on wage employment generation type 
poverty reduction programmes. It was considered a success story in the 1980s despite 
its limited size compared to the need and non-implementation of the compensation 
clause. Doubling of wages in 1988 without adequate budgetary support led to fall in 
employment by one-third (Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri 1993). In the debate on 
employment programmes, the level of the ‘right’ wage rate - the minimum at which 
the very poor group might be offering work or a higher wage rate that could be 
considered ‘decent’ and lift the beneficiaries above the poverty line, has been a point 
of discussion. A major advantage according to advocates of such programmes is the 
self-selection nature in the sense that it would normally attract participation from the 
poor group which would otherwise not get sufficient employment opportunities in the 
normal economic activities. However, if such a wage rate happens to be very low, it 
might go against the objective of lifting the poor above the poverty line. A higher 
wage rate, on the other hand, could defeat the self-selection objective as it might 
attract people employed in normal economic activities and increase the error in 
targeting. Rationing available volume of employment would mean the poorest of the 
poor would have to compete with those around or above the poverty line and the latter 
having greater chances of selection.  
 
  15 
 
The partial payment of the wages in kind has been justified on grounds that such 
payments directly help enhance food security of the participants insuring the 
recipients against fall in their purchasing power due to price rise or unavailability of 
foodgrains. The programmes are meant to protect the poor households against 
seasonal vulnerability in food security. In this context, timing, frequency and quantity 
of deliveries of foodgrains become crucial. At the same time, the poor would not 
prefer full payment of wages in kind as they need to buy non-food items from the 
market. Moreover, wages in kind increase transaction costs for the funding agency.    
  
While creation of some durable assets in rural areas is a major objective of 
employment programmes, some authors have recognized a trade-off between the short 
run relief objective and the long run rehabilitation and development objective (Barrett, 
Holden and Clay 2004). While employment creation is the immediate urgent need in a 
relief work, creation and maintenance of productive assets like roads, school 
buildings, soil and water conservation structures needs more careful planning as per 
need of the locality. Involvement of local community in identification and 
maintenance is generally required for success of such programmes. 
 
The objectives of providing employment and creating durable infrastructure under 
EGS or its predecessor SGRY are modelled on the lines of the MEGS and other 
similar programmes. Some of the main observations from a recent evaluation study by 
Panda et al (2005) indicate that that the food-for-work component of SGRY had a 
mixed success record. Most of the beneficiaries were likely to be around or below the 
poverty line, but there were some deviations indicating failure of targeting. Average 
employment available to a beneficiary under SGRY was about 30 days in a year, but 
some beneficiaries did not get work for more than a week. There was lack of peoples’ 
involvement in identifying beneficiaries and undertaking works useful for the village. 
Most respondents reported that foodgrains received were of good or average quality. 
But the beneficiaries did not receive foodgrains or wages on time.  
 
Poor maintenance of records is a larger issue. Given the objective of supplementing 
the earning opportunity for the poor during the lean season and natural calamities, the 
size of SGRY needs to be flexible. This requires coordination between government 
officials, Panchayati Raj Institutions and local non-governmental organisations. 
Timing is crucial for the success of SGRY. Demand for regular public works is high 
during February to June (a time interspersed between two financial years). So, unless 
sufficient food and funds are available during these months, out-migration creating 
footloose labour with less bargaining power becomes a regular feature.
10 Other 
studies on similar programmes have pointed out irregularities in the form of fudging 
muster rolls, prevalence of corruption, non-availability of work in the lean season, 




A study by Panda and Mishra (2005) largely involving below poverty line households 
in two districts of Maharashtra (one in the National Sample Survey (NSS) Coastal 
region and the other in the NSS Inland Eastern region), indicates that nearly half the 
below poverty line households were in a situation where all family members did not 
                                                 
10 For an elaborate discussion on footloose labour see Breman (1996). 
11 See, for example, Planning Commission (2000), Policy and Development Initiatives (2000), and Sen 
(2003) among others. 
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get two square meals a day at some time or the other during the year (Table 5).
12 This 
survey was designed to choose 80 per cent poor households in the sample in areas that 
might be characterized as less than average developed. Adjusting for this, one gets 
roughly 6-8 per cent rural households facing food shortages at some time or the other 
during the year. This figure is in sharp contrast to hunger incidence of 3 per 1,000 
rural households or 5 per farmer household in the state reported by National Sample 





Food Deficit Below Poverty Line Households across Seasons (%) 
Season Jawhar,  Thane  Yavatmal  Toal 
N 88  81  169 
Winter 14  11  12 
Summer 25  19  22 
Monsoon 51 31  41 
Any one season  48  17  33 
Any Two seasons  6  9  7 
All three seasons  10  9  9 
At some time  64  35  50 
Note: N indicates number of below poverty line households surveyed. 
Source: Panda and Mishra (2005) 
 
Across seasons, vulnerability was higher during the monsoon months. Many of the 
food insecure households resorted to migration to make both ends meet. This also 
affected their utilization of benefits from public facilities like Anganwadi and schools 
that existed in their villages. Their vulnerability can be understood from the case of a 
child death discussed in Box 2. One also observed non-payment of wages under 
public works and denial of food subsidies by not providing appropriate ration cards. 
There were also instances of some success stories - The “Wadi Project” (horticulture 
development) linked with MEGS and other programmes lead to improved livelihood 
opportunities (see Box 3). 
 
                                                 
12 The situation was more severe in Jawhar, a tribal taluka in Thane (NSS Coastal Region), which is 
about three/four hours drive from Mumbai.  
13 At the all India level, 59
th round estimates indicate that 16 per 1000 rural households and 12 per 1000 
farmer households were food deficit households. Across states, the maximum number of food deficit 
households is in Orissa: 71 per 1000 rural households and 54 per 1000 farmer households. The 
estimates for rural households and farmer households are based on different sample frames. 
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Box 2: Case of Child Death in Jawhar 
The anganwadi centre of Nagarmoda village reported 3 deaths and 1 stillbirth in the 
last two years. One case is from a below poverty line household which also faced food 
shortage at times. The family loses a son who is a little more than three years of age in 
November 2003. The boy who suffered from respiratory ailment was taken to the 
Rural Hospital at Jawhar. After initial treatment the doctor recommended that he be 
taken to JJ Hospital in Mumbai. Medical expenses would have been taken care of at 
the public health facility, but other opportunity costs made the family decide to return. 
Back in the village, neighbours, the anganwadi worker and gram sevak coaxed the 
family members to take the child to JJ Hospital. A few days later, after trying their 
luck with local healers, they returned to the public health facility at Jawhar, but it was 
too late. For this case, the family had sought treatment from local healers, public and 
private facilities and spent Rs.5000 on medical expenses and Rs.1000 on travel. The 
family now has three surviving children; one is the deceased boy’s twin sister. 
 
Box 3: Successful Utilization of Various Schemes by BAIF in Jawhar 
Bharat Agro Industries Foundation (BAIF), a non-governmental organization (NGO), 
operates in tribal regions of 8-9 states of India. They have some presence in Jawhar 
taluka of Thane distrtict. Interventions by BAIF in some villages are very recent. We 
happened to visit a successful experiment in the village of Kelichapada where BAIF 
has been present for 6-7 years. One of their major interventions is through 
development of Wadi’s, which when literally translated means orchard. To begin 
with, self-help groups are formed with 6-8 beneficiaries, each having 2-3 acres of land 
adjacent to each other. In the initial years the beneficiaries in Kelichapada worked on 
(a) their own plots leading to land development and planting of horticultural crops 
like cashew, guava and lemon and (b) construction of a water harvesting structure on 
a nearby stream. The inputs/help provided by BAIF came from different schemes. The 
formation of self-help groups under Swarnjayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), 
wages for their labour from Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana 
(SGRY)/Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) for three years – the 
time required for trees to bear fruit, non-wage expenses for land development, water 
harvesting structure and sapling of fruit bearing trees from MEGS or other 
government schemes. BAIF has also helped them organize and sell their produce in 
the market.  Today the households no more migrate. The enrolment, retention and 
attendance of school going children has improved, their consumption and nutritional 
intake has increased and annual household incomes have more than doubled. BAIF’s 
intervention has also helped landless households take up livestock rearing or other 
activities. 
 
In Maharashtra, MEGS has been largely successful in providing relief, but not as a 
poverty eradication measure. The recent introduction of horticulture schemes (mostly 
in Coastal region) in individual household farms under MEGS has been successful 
from the productivity point of view (Vatsa, 2005). The share of the poor in the NSS 
regions of Eastern, Inland Eastern, Inland Central and Inland Northern is higher than 
their share of the population, but expenditure under MEGS is higher than the share of 
poor only in Inland Central, a drought prone region. Between 2000-01 and 2003-04, 
expenditure under MEGS was not higher than the share of rural poor in Eastern, 
Inland Eastern and Inland Northern regions. In fact, the share of the two latter regions 
has been declining. Item-wise expenditure under MEGS (Table 6), aggregated for 
four years (2000-01 to 2003-04), shows that in comparison to its share of the poor 
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relatively greater proportion of expenditure is for roads, forestry and horticulture in 
the Coastal region. In the Inland Western region it has been for agriculture, irrigation, 
Jawahar wells and horticulture and for roads, agriculture, irrigation, forestry, and 
Jawahar wells in the Inland Central region; for irrigation and establishment in the 
Eastern region and for miscellaneous in the Inland Northern region. Notable region-
specific expenditure under MEGS are horticulture in the Coastal region (41 per cent), 
agriculture in the Inland Western region (36 per cent) and irrigation in the Inland 
Central region (53 per cent). These expenditure patterns under MEGS show that the 
Eastern, Inland Eastern and Inland Northern regions have not benefited much from 
this scheme. This indicates poor intervention in agriculture either directly or indirectly 
through interventions in irrigation and horticulture. It assumes greater importance 
because these recent years also coincided with a spate of farmer suicides which was 
particularly high in the Inland Eastern (western Vidarbha) region of Maharashtra. 
 
Table 6 
Item-wise Share of MEGS Expenditure Across NSS Regions of Maharashtra, 
2000-01 to 2003-04 (%) 










Rural population, 2001  11.1 28.3 14.4 21.1 17.3 7.8  100.0  (5.6)
Rural poor, 1999-2000  8.8  13.7 18.8 21.3 23.2 14.2  100.0  (1.3)
Item      
Roads#   11.5  12.8 14.4 38.0 13.0 10.3  100.0  (954.8)
Agriculture# 8.4  36.3 6.1 36.7 4.2 8.3  100.0  (929.9)
Irrigation# 0.3  17.2 7.7 53.4 6.5 15.0  100.0  (528.6)
Forestry# 10.7  10.6 13.7 33.2 17.9 14.0  100.0  (331.1)
Jawahar Wells#  7.0  20.5 14.4 25.7 21.6 10.7  100.0  (218.1)
Horticulture# 40.9  19.8 7.4 16.1 13.0 2.8  100.0  (211.9)
Establishment# 2.6  19.2 12.2 36.5 13.5 16.0  100.0  (86.7)
Miscellaneous# 5.3  20.4 19.1 43.1 5.9 6.3  100.0  (76.9)
Total# 10.0  21.1 10.6 37.5 10.4 10.5  100.0  (3338.0)
Total, 10 years$  10.4  21.5 9.8 35.8 11.4 11.1  100.0  (5523.4)
Note: * Figures in parentheses indicate total (in crore: number of population/poor and expenditure in 
rupees). For expenditure under MEGS it excludes certain miscellaneous expenditure at the aggregate 
level for the state. # Item-wise as well as total expenditure has been combined for four years: 2000-
01 to 2003-04. $ Total 10 years data are average for 1994-95 to 2003-04. 
Source: Mishra and Panda (2006). 
 
The problems of national rural EGS in a recent survey in Jharkhand point out the 
following difficulties: selling of application form for job cards, issuing of job cards to 
only below poverty line households and providing only one card for joint (not 
nuclear) households, providing defective job cards with no space to record wage 
payments, not maintaining muster rolls at worksites, fudging muster rolls, flawed 
work measurement, non payment of minimum wages, delayed wage payment. People 
are not aware that they have to apply for work and get a dated receipt for the same, 
unavailability of worksite facilities like shade for rest, drinking water and crèche, 
creation of productive assets is not up to the mark, fictitious gram sabhas, absence of 
elected representatives at local levels as elections to local bodies have not been held, 
involvement of middlemen, and excessive work load on local level government 
functionaries are some more of the problems. A public meeting held at the end of the 
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survey was attended by 2000 poor labourers from neighbouring villages where 
pointed questions to the Block Development Officer (BDO) and gram sevaks and the 
local elected member of the legislative assembly who initially wanted to scuttle the 
meeting but having failed to do so he had to turn up. This passed on the message that 
local officials and elected representative are ultimately accountable to the people 
(Bhatia and Dreze 2006).
14  
 
One of the major limitations of the current employment guarantee is to restrict 
employment guarantee to only 100 days per household. This restriction is with the 
understanding that these households get some employment from other avenues, 
particularly agriculture. If agriculture is under strain then this assumption will not 
hold. Thus, in years of agrarian distress or in relatively poorer regions or for some 
other reason if households demand employment beyond 100 days then the 
administrative mechanism should try to address it. A failure in this regard will not 
come under the legal scanner of entitlement under a guarantee, but it would certainly 
be a failure in the domain of welfare. The success of the programme will also require 
that the provision is widely disseminated and people are made to be involved in at 
various stages. A mass social audit undertaken in Dungarpur,
15 a relatively poorer 
tribal district of Rajasthan from where seasonal migration is widespread, suggests that 
with a supportive administration and people willing to monitor the ongoing scheme 
can contain the corruption to a large extent and create assets that not only reflect 
people’s demand (in this drought-prone region first priority was given to 
building/repairing water-harvesting structures) but would also help in enhancing 
livelihood opportunities  (Sivakumar 2006). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The situation is very complex. As per the 2003 situation assessment survey of 
farmers, 40 per cent of the farmers do not want to continue in the profession. They 
foresee a life of poverty and they would like to get out of this. The surge in farmers' 
suicides, which is symptomatic of a larger agrarian crisis, seems to be spreading. 
Relief measures should address all possible risks, the most important being the 
inadequate income that agriculture provides for the large mass of farmers. The income 
shortfall is further accentuated because of crop loss, market uncertainties (increasing 
input costs and decline in output prices) and additional expenditure requirements 
(health needs, wards education and daughter's marriage among others). Without 
adequate safeguards, the farmer will require more and more credit that will lead him 
to a quagmire of indebtedness. Interventions in the credit market are required 
(particularly, to reduce the high cost of borrowing from informal sources), but on their 
own they are not likely to achieve much. Policy interventions should independently 
address all possible risks: income shortfalls, crop loss (weather, pests, theft, fire or 
spurious quality of seeds and other inputs), price shocks, increasing input costs and 
other uncertainties. Social safety measures should look into health, education and 
other relevant expenses. If farmers need a strong state support to enhance their 
livelihoods then the mass of agricultural labourers who depend on farmers would 
require even greater support. 
 
                                                 
14 Another positive aspect indicating how different perspectives can come together is that the survey 
has been conducted by students from Delhi School of Economics and Jawaharlal Nehru University.  
15 This social audit involved activists and researchers from across the country and also a few from 
outside India.  
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Additional employment opportunities might provide some succour. Public 
interventions in employment have tried to focus on an appropriate wage rate (a 
balance between providing decent income and also one that would lead to targeting 
through self-selection by the poor), the nature of wage payment (some payments in 
kind to ensure food security and some in cash to meet non-food requirements) and in 
generating productive assets for the rural community. Some criticisms of these 
programmes is that the number of days of employment available was low, wage 
payments were delayed, kind payments were of poor quality, unavailability of work 
site facilities, creation of productive assets is not up to the mark and most important is 
siphoning of funds through corruption among others. A major channel of leakage was 
through fudging of muster roles. The provisions of transparency and public 
monitoring at each and every stage of EGS work (planning, implementation and 
stock-taking) under NREGA allows for evaluation of on-going work through social 
audit. This would check corruption much more than the annual checks which can only 
unearth book-keeping anomalies. Despite the limitation of restricting employment 
guarantee to only 100 days per household, “NREGA has created a sense of hope 
amongst the rural poor. This sense of hope can be further strengthened if people 
understand that the act gives them employment as a matter of right, and that claiming 
this right is within the realm of possibility” (Bhatia and Dreze 2006). 
 
To sum up, the post-reform agrarian scenario has been a story of distress, despair and 
death. This, however, is not the end of the tunnel. For every death there are thousands 
in distress who continue to struggle and hope for a better tomorrow. In tackling 
agrarian crisis or ensuring employment guarantee one has to build on this hope. 
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Appendix 1 
Incremental Value of Output in Agriculture (TE 2002-03 over TE 1992-93) and its Share over Crop Groups Across States    






















  A  &  N  Islands  2146 -1.3 -1.4  9.4  0.0  0.5  55.1  39.7  0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2  100.0   
  Andhra  Pradesh  227354 24.7 16.8  -26.6 13.1  5.8  47.9  21.3  -5.0  2.5 -1.1  0.6  100.0   
  Arunachal  Pradesh  -14859 -3.1 -1.5 -4.3  0.0 -0.3 124.7  -14.4 -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1  100.0   
  Assam  144021 25.4  2.9  3.4 -1.2 -2.4  37.5  13.6 19.4 -0.3  0.5  1.3  100.0   
  Bihar  636876  24.3  -2.0 0.2 0.0  -2.5 75.8  -0.2 0.8 0.0 2.3 1.2  100.0   
  Chandigarh  558  32.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 48.1  0.0 0.0 3.0  14.9 1.1  100.0   
  Dadra  &  Nagar  Haveli  972  -8.7 6.4  -0.3 0.0 0.0 99.2  0.0 0.0 0.4 4.7  -1.7  100.0   
  Daman  &  Diu  -278  26.6  -10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.6  0.0 0.0 2.2  -1.3  -0.1  100.0   
  Delhi  15067 -2.4 -0.4  2.0  0.0  0.0 105.4  0.1  0.0 -0.8 -3.6 -0.3  100.0   
  Goa  12796  -2.0 2.1 4.5 0.0  -0.7 93.3  3.0 0.0  -0.4 0.0 0.2  100.0   
  Gujarat  62512 -44.2 -43.0  10.9  6.1  30.7  137.0  14.8  -7.9 -17.7  6.8  6.6 100.0   
  Haryana  178409  73.4  -16.2 0.6  -8.7 8.6 33.4  0.8 0.2 4.7 3.1 0.3  100.0   
  Himachal  Pradesh  41058 -8.6  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.6 101.9  2.3  0.2 -0.8  1.3  0.7  100.0   
  Jammu  &  Kashmir  11342  -63.5  -10.3  -11.0 0.2  -0.6  172.9  9.3  -10.5 1.2 3.8 8.5  100.0   
  Karnataka  420719 8.4 5.1  -6.9  -2.7  22.8 38.4  23.4 7.7 2.5 0.0 1.2  100.0   
  Kerala  103244  -20.3 -0.3 28.1 -1.0  0.0 -28.8  28.5 54.9 -5.0 43.2  0.6  100.0   
  Lakshadweep  151 0.0 0.0  207.5 0.0 0.0  -107.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0   
  Madhya  Pradesh  94201 -56.6  11.5  62.8  0.7  2.5  106.3  0.9  1.1 -20.6  -8.0  -0.6 100.0   
  Maharashtra  594686  -6.5 7.4 8.2 9.7  22.1 56.9  0.1 0.0  -1.4 5.3  -1.8  100.0   
  Manipur  10020  39.9 3.3  -0.3 0.0  -2.6 50.5  8.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.5  100.0   
  Meghalaya  14125  35.3 0.2 0.5 0.4  -0.1 50.2  8.5 1.0 0.0 3.6 0.4  100.0   
  Mizoram  7307 32.6 -5.2 -2.1 -1.1  1.6  60.6  24.0 -6.9 -0.7 -3.5  0.7  100.0   
  Nagaland  52155  12.0 2.6 7.3 0.1  -0.9 60.8  16.4 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.4  100.0   
  Orissa  -67335 70.6 65.9 71.1  1.8 10.3 -131.5  4.6  3.3  6.6 -0.2 -2.5  100.0   
  Pondicherry  645 -5.9  -19.9  -67.8 -7.3  -36.6 227.8  -9.3 14.0 -3.7  7.0  1.5  100.0   
  Punjab  169019  121.0 -2.8 -6.8  -41.2  8.6  19.6  1.1  0.1  1.5 -0.9 -0.1  100.0   
  Rajasthan  -8338  -436.4 291.8 282.8 417.0  70.3  -262.9  -468.1  -45.2 100.7 147.6  2.3 100.0   
  Sikkim  621 3.0  -56.8  -76.9 0.0 0.0  206.4  41.1 0.0  -15.7 0.0  -1.2  100.0   
  Tamil  Nadu  151842 -28.0  -4.8 -12.7  -9.7  35.6  97.4  13.9  5.2  0.2  1.4  1.6 100.0   
  Tripura  37769 14.3 -0.1 -1.8 -0.5 -0.6  68.4  7.3  5.5 -0.4  7.5  0.4  100.0   
  Uttar  Pradesh  689337 46.4 -5.1 -3.9 -0.1 12.6  44.8  0.2  2.3  2.3 -0.2  0.7  100.0   
  West  Bengal  536327  28.8  -0.1 2.0 4.6 1.0 51.0  1.6 9.9 0.9  -0.1 0.4  100.0   








Returns to Cultivation Across States, 2002-03 
































































Andaman & Nicobar Is  98.0  0.9 17928 14.8 70.6 0.6 15952 5.9  21889 5.0
Andhra Pradesh  81.7  1.2 5243 62.3 39.1 0.9 7815 52.8  8105 4.7
Arunachal Pradesh  74.8  1.3 13909 13.5 68.4 0.8 8433 22.1  17950 5.0
Assam   95.9  0.8 16257 12.7 84.7 0.4 16089 19.0  19145 5.7
Bihar   87.0  0.7 8065 39.6 95.2 0.6 10180 37.8  10635 6.1
Chandigarh   59.6  0.9 15120 40.6 68.8 0.5 20782 34.5  15715 6.3
Chattisgarh 98.6  1.3 5355 39.2 26.9 0.8 4296 39.4  7732 5.4
Dadra&Nagar 99.3  0.6 5424 37.5 30.0 0.7 5052 44.2  4455 5.5
Daman&Diu 89.3  0.2 8007 43.7 39.0 0.2 5375 54.7  1677 5.6
Delhi   82.9  0.5 25848 43.5 75.9 0.5 30814 32.6  23834 5.1
Goa   78.0  0.6 11911 27.1 47.0 0.7 15992 27.9  10304 4.5
Gujarat   85.2  1.6 6005 46.8 39.3 1.2 8621 49.3  12527 5.5
Haryana 64.1  1.6 5832 56.9 64.0 1.6 14537 40.7  21055 6.0
Himachal Pradesh  97.1  0.5 16432 28.2 94.6 0.4 5377 50.8  9536 5.2
Jammu & Kashmir  94.7  0.7 28446 17.7 84.9 0.6 10833 26.8  24759 5.8
Jharkand 96.9  0.7 10420 21.1 41.8 0.3 14117 28.1  8577 5.4
Karnataka 95.1  1.5 6522 46.0 47.1 1.3 6536 36.6  13395 5.3
Kerala 93.6  0.4 17724 38.8 94.5 0.4 18220 34.1  13521 4.7
Lakshadweep   80.8  0.1 82751 7.8 100.0 0.1 42229 9.2  14530 6.8
Madhya Pradesh  77.3  1.6 3882 45.3 67.3 1.7 7305 35.8  13146 5.8
Maharashtra   94.4  1.6 6609 45.0 45.2 1.1 5505 47.9  12721 5.1
Manipur 84.3  0.6 16697 28.2 51.3 0.2 6682 41.9  9093 5.5
Meghalaya 99.5  1.0 22860 18.1 96.1 1.3 11082 17.9  36415 5.4
Mizoram 90.9  1.0 18905 3.8 89.3 1.1 14823 3.5  32793 5.7
Nagaland 91.2  0.5 29592 7.2 96.3 0.3 17578 17.1  20105 5.1
Orissa 98.1  0.8 3633 48.1 25.2 0.4 5284 50.9  3307 5.0
Pondicherry   47.4  1.3 11883 50.0 38.9 0.7 9421 57.7  9783 4.7
Punjab   36.9  2.5 19974 38.4 27.6 2.6 20929 37.5  32866 5.9
Rajasthan 91.3  1.9 271 89.0 37.0 1.4 10954 40.5  5972 5.9
Sikkim   98.9  0.7 11807 22.3 97.6 0.4 7275 33.8  10900 5.3
Tamil Nadu  79.1  0.8 6682 57.9 44.1 0.8 8562 45.1  7511 4.4
Tripura 91.3  0.5 15333 30.5 62.7 0.3 17500 31.0  9231 5.0
Uttar Pradesh  81.8  0.7 7025 44.1 87.8 0.9 8490 46.0  10824 6.1
Uttaranchal 93.1  0.5 36647 11.9 93.0 0.4 8914 28.0  19315 5.1
West Bengal   89.7  0.5 10942 44.6 71.0 0.4 10976 57.2  8174 5.3
India   86.2  1.1 6756 43.9 62.3 0.9 9290 42.2  11258 5.5
Note:. GCA=Gross Cropped Area, Ha=Hectares, HH=Household, Rs=Indian Rupees, Gross returns equal value of output 
minus expenses. Expenses are those paid out only, and hence, it does not include family labour or rent for own land. Value 
of output is total produce times price, it includes by-products also.  
Source: Calculated from unit level data using 33
rd Schedule, 59
th round of National Sample Survey (NSS) on Situation 
Assessment Survey of Farmers. 
 




Appendix 2b (1)  
Returns to Cultivation Across NSS Regions, 2002-03 


































































AN1 98.0  0.9  17928 14.8 70.6 0.6 15952 5.9 21889  5.0 
AP1 68.6  0.9  6813 66.1 44.8 0.8 5890 62.8 6662  4.4 
AP2 94.7  1.3  5087 57.9 34.2 0.9 9331 43.4 9072  4.8 
AP3 84.5  2.0  5448 54.0 35.4 1.3 9018 39.6 13366  5.3 
AP4 76.7  0.9  -855 108.6 41.1 0.9 8651 62.5 2604  4.5 
AR1 74.8  1.3  13909 13.5 68.4 0.8 8433 22.1 17950  5.0 
AS1 97.7  0.9  17573 9.8 86.6 0.4 14900 17.8 19469  5.6 
AS2 94.1  0.8  14858 16.0 84.1 0.5 16920 19.7 19149  5.7 
AS3 100.0  0.7  20211 7.0 74.4 0.2 11922 19.0 16136  5.4 
BI1 88.9  0.6  6699 42.0 96.2 0.6 10022 38.2 8996  5.9 
BI2 83.9  0.8  9909 37.1 93.5 0.7 10393 37.3 13347  6.4 
CN1 59.6  0.9  15120 40.6 68.8 0.5 20782 34.5 15715  6.3 
CT1 98.6  1.3  5355 39.2 26.9 0.8 4296 39.4 7732  5.4 
DD1 89.3  0.2  8007 43.7 39.0 0.2 5375 54.7 1677  5.6 
DE1 82.9  0.5  25848 43.5 75.9 0.5 30814 32.6 23834  5.1 
DN1 99.3  0.6  5424 37.5 30.0 0.7 5052 44.2 4455  5.5 
GO1 78.0  0.6  11911 27.1 47.0 0.7 15992 27.9 10304  4.5 
GU1 93.8  1.0  6454 29.1 30.6 0.7 13474 34.4 9102  5.9 
GU2 75.9  1.1  3639 58.4 52.0 1.1 9088 47.0 8363  5.2 
GU3 85.4  1.2  9488 41.5 37.0 1.2 7179 57.6 12651  5.9 
GU4 84.6  2.4  2793 62.3 41.3 1.8 10229 48.2 13377  5.7 
GU5 89.5  2.9  7507 45.7 30.6 1.4 4504 62.3 21564  5.3 
HA1 65.7  1.3  8854 55.6 69.1 1.4 16504 41.8 23095  6.0 
HA2 62.2  1.9  3075 59.9 57.6 2.0 12601 39.2 18515  5.9 
HP1 97.1  0.5  16432 28.2 94.6 0.4 5377 50.8 9536  5.2 
JH1 96.9  0.7  10420 21.1 41.8 0.3 14117 28.1 8577  5.4 
JK1 87.5  0.8  16234 19.0 80.9 0.8 9918 26.8 17523  5.5 
JK2 100.0  0.9  8029 20.1 93.1 0.9 11068 18.2 16989  5.2 
JK3 94.4  0.5  67803 17.0 80.7 0.3 11360 41.5 34119  6.3 
KA1 95.6  0.8  12171 43.7 80.6 0.5 14538 29.3 14874  6.0 
KA2 98.7  1.3  8472 47.4 42.0 1.0 6893 39.8 13696  4.8 
KA3 95.3  0.9  6827 51.3 40.2 0.9 6322 43.4 8114  4.9 
KA4 93.2  2.2  5538 43.3 49.2 1.9 5945 34.8 16956  5.7 
KE1 91.3  0.5  14788 39.3 94.0 0.5 15048 31.5 14345  5.4 
KE2 95.0  0.3  20438 38.5 94.8 0.3 21278 35.8 13015  4.3 
LA1 80.8  0.1  82751 7.8 100.0 0.1 42228 9.2 14530  6.8 
MA1 97.1  0.5  7030 45.6 10.4 0.6 8365 37.9 3747  4.9 
MA2 88.7  1.1  10070 41.6 54.6 1.0 5448 53.0 12475  5.1 
MA3 94.3  1.9  6776 45.7 34.4 1.4 10460 37.6 17318  5.8 
MA4 95.9  2.2  7252 37.7 57.7 1.3 4046 43.5 18339  5.5 
MA5 98.6  2.3  4494 53.3 48.0 1.1 5773 51.0 13278  4.7 
MA6 98.8  1.5  2968 63.6 33.9 0.6 1843 64.1 4812  4.8 
ME1 99.5  1.0  22860 18.1 96.1 1.3 11082 17.9 36415  5.4 
MI1 90.9  1.0  18905 3.8 89.3 1.1 14823 3.5 32793  5.7 
MN1 76.7  0.6  13673 47.9 55.3 0.1 664 91.5 6199  5.7 
MN2 90.8  0.6  18736 11.7 47.9 0.2 11621 20.0 11539  5.3 
MP1 80.3  1.2  3799 29.8 81.8 1.5 6750 30.3 11828  5.9 
MP2 44.4  1.7  1736 68.7 93.7 2.1 5447 43.3 11860  5.5 
MP3 97.1  1.9  4190 43.7 35.7 1.2 11788 32.2 12765  6.1 
MP4 93.0  1.5  4607 37.2 71.0 1.4 7176 33.3 13281  5.2 
MP5 94.5  2.5  5237 53.1 69.5 2.0 9503 36.2 25565  5.6 
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Returns to Cultivation Across NSS Regions, 2002-03 


































































NA1 91.2  0.5  29592 7.2 96.3 0.3 17578 17.1 20105  5.1 
OR1 98.1  0.7  4387 52.2 44.5 0.4 4917 49.5 3904  5.3 
OR2 97.0  0.9  2482 48.6 10.0 0.8 4142 46.6 2590  4.5 
OR3 98.7  0.8  3755 42.2 14.3 0.3 8503 56.3 3115  4.9 
PO1 47.4  1.3  11883 50.0 38.9 0.7 9421 57.7 9783  4.7 
PU1 35.8  2.3  18584 40.4 20.0 2.2 16684 42.2 22600  5.7 
PU2 38.2  2.6  21312 36.7 36.5 2.8 23038 35.6 44813  6.0 
RA1 88.4  4.2  -304 121.3 27.6 2.8 9817 38.4 6433  6.0 
RA2 87.8  1.2  -327 111.3 49.4 1.2 11003 44.2 6153  6.4 
RA3 98.6  0.7  3520 30.6 28.8 0.4 12500 27.6 3593  5.0 
RA4 98.0  1.2  3182 50.4 32.7 0.7 18383 33.9 7921  5.5 
SI1 98.9  0.7  11807 22.3 97.6 0.4 7275 33.8 10900  5.3 
TN1 74.4  0.7  7300 61.4 34.3 0.7 8952 48.5 6198  4.8 
TN2 74.6  0.6  2402 80.5 40.4 0.9 5822 59.8 3225  4.5 
TN3 80.3  0.8  3998 65.1 35.2 0.7 6925 45.7 4242  4.0 
TN4 88.1  1.1  10865 44.1 69.1 1.0 10748 35.5 17615  4.2 
TR1 91.3  0.5  15333 30.5 62.7 0.3 17500 31.0 9231  5.0 
UP1 82.4  0.8  9903 43.1 85.3 0.8 14110 46.3 16784  6.1 
UP2 72.0  0.6  8574 36.9 80.3 1.5 4910 45.5 9784  5.6 
UP3 87.4  0.7  5055 48.9 92.9 0.6 7202 47.0 6869  6.3 
UP4 67.9  1.2  1248 46.8 88.5 1.7 7385 42.1 12135  5.7 
UT1 93.1  0.5  36646 11.9 93.0 0.4 8914 28.0 19315  5.1 
WB1 92.7  0.6  15583 23.6 95.9 0.4 17775 41.3 15082  5.4 
WB2 85.4  0.6  11185 44.5 81.5 0.5 10237 51.4 9934  5.2 
WB3 86.1  0.5  9528 54.2 70.6 0.4 7612 72.4 5850  5.2 
WB4 97.0  0.5  10316 42.8 52.6 0.3 14255 52.5 6827  5.4 
India   86.2  1.1  6756 43.9 62.3 0.9 9290 42.2 11258  5.5 
Note and source: As in Appendix 2a. The region codes indicate the following: AN1=Andaman & Nicobar Is, 
AP=Andhra Pradesh, AP1=Coastal, AP2=Inland Northern, AP3=South Western, AP4=Inland Southern, 
AR1=Arunachal Pradesh, AS=Assam, AS1=Plains Eastern, AS2=Plains Western and AS3=Hills, BI=Bihar, 
BI1=Northern, BI2=Central, CN1=Chandigarh, CT1=Chattisgarh, DD1=Daman & Diu, DE1=Delhi, DN1=Dadra 
& Nagar Haveli, GO1=Goa, GU=Gujarat, GU1=Eastern, GU2=Plains Northern, GU3=Plains Southern, GU4=Dry 
Areas, GU5=Saurashtra, HA=Haryana, HA1=Eastern, HA2=Western, HP1=Himachal Pradesh, JK=Jammu & 
Kashmir, JK1=Mountainous, JK2=Outer Hills, JK3=Jhelam Valley, JH1=Jharkhand, KA=Karnataka, 
KA1=Coastal & Ghats, KA2=Inland Eastern, KA3=Inland Southern, KA4=Inland Northern, KE=Kerala, 
KE1=Northern, KE2=Southern, LA1=Lakshadweep, MA=Maharashtra, MA1=Coastal, MA2=Inland Western, 
MA3=Inland Northern, MA4=Inland Central, MA5=Inland Eastern, MA6=Eastern, ME1=Meghalaya, 
MI1=Mizoran, MN=Manipur, MN1=Plains, MN2=Hills, MP=Madhya Pradesh, MP1=Vindhya, MP2=Central, 
MP3=Malwa, MP4=South, MP5=South Western, MP6=Northern, NA1=Nagaland, OR=Orissa, OR1=Coastal, 
OR2=Southern, OR3=Northern, PO1=Pondicherry, PU=Punjab, PU1=Northern, PU2=Southern, RA=Rajasthan, 
RA1=Western, RA2=North Eastern, RA3=Southern, RA4=South Eastern, SI1=Sikkim, TN=Tamil Nadu, 
TN1=Coastal Northern, TN2=Coastal, TN3=Southern, TN4=Inland, TR1=Tripura, UT1=Uttaranchal, UP=Uttar 
Pradesh, UP1=Western, UP2=Central, UP3=Eastern, UP4=Southern, WB=West Bengal, WB1=Himalayan, 
WB2=Eastern Plains, WB3=Central Plains and WB4=Western Plains. 




















































































Andaman & Nicobar Is  0.1 5.7  26.6 5079 56.6 74.0 94.2 77.3  21.2  83.5 14.1
Andhra Pradesh  60.3 14460.0  82.1 23965 64.7 30.6 67.6 78.1  81.5  66.4 19.9
Arunachal 1.2 6.1  5.9 493 10.6 26.9 30.2 69.4  6.1  71.8 1.9
Assam 25.0 203.5  18.1 813 39.4 37.4 51.0 90.0  18.4  83.1 6.9
Bihar 70.8 3168.9  33.0 4476 47.1 41.7 76.3 93.4  33.9  87.0 11.9
Chandigarh 0.0 4.0  46.4 19917 39.8 36.7 59.3 95.1  45.7  45.9 1.6
Chattisgarh 27.6 1137.6  40.2 4122 78.4 71.3 63.6 77.3  39.1  48.0 25.9
Dadra&Nagar 0.2 4.0  26.4 1736 49.0 51.4 84.4 93.1  24.5  87.1 15.2
Daman&Diu 0.0 1.5  41.4 3117 68.4 61.4 61.7 99.0  41.5  99.1 23.1
Delhi 0.1 7.6  42.9 6702 33.4 89.3 65.8 98.8  43.4  100.0 46.1
Goa 0.6 7.8  6.6 1292 39.8 64.3 100.0 94.7  3.8  94.0 3.9
Gujarat 37.8 5875.9  51.9 15526 74.5 68.8 65.4 75.9  46.1  39.5 23.0
Haryana 19.4 5056.9  53.1 26007 69.0 67.2 60.8 76.1  49.2  51.9 31.3
Himachal Pradesh  9.1 871.4  33.4 9618 48.5 63.5 61.2 93.1  33.0  82.7 20.7
Jammu & Kashmir  9.4 179.5  31.8 1903 53.2 67.5 50.9 91.6  30.1  77.4 19.5
Jharkand 28.2 622.5  20.9 2205 57.3 64.1 82.4 94.7  21.0  87.5 12.9
Karnataka 40.4 7328.9  61.6 18135 78.0 68.8 67.9 74.2  60.7  51.8 34.8
Kerala 21.9 7441.4  64.4 33907 44.2 81.4 73.8 96.7  64.4  90.3 52.8
Lakshadweep 0.0 1.1  47.3 6183 2.7 34.4 56.5 99.1  46.8  99.7 14.9
Madhya Pradesh  63.2 8986.7  50.8 14218 69.7 56.3 77.6 66.7  45.2  40.0 22.4
Maharashtra 65.8 11171.3  54.8 16973 80.2 83.0 74.3 68.6  48.8  44.9 39.9
Manipur 2.1 48.7  24.8 2269 15.7 18.2 87.6 98.6  24.8  97.1 4.8
Meghalaya 2.5 1.8  4.0 72 78.5 6.0 33.2 81.6  4.4  95.6 0.2
Mizoram 0.8 14.6  23.6 1876 66.5 63.6 78.2 83.7  25.1  96.8 15.8
Nagaland 0.8 8.3  36.5 1030 36.4 68.8 11.3 95.1  37.7  85.8 24.5
Orissa 42.3 2485.7  47.8 5871 64.7 74.3 72.3 92.3  47.1  86.5 34.5
Pondicherry 0.3 63.7  80.1 20927 27.6 59.6 52.6 85.6  82.0  85.6 46.0
Punjab 18.4 7667.4  65.4 41576 66.7 47.5 55.8 75.7  59.8  29.1 26.3
Rajasthan 53.1 9752.1  52.4 18372 59.4 33.7 79.8 66.0  50.5  41.6 12.9
Sikkim 0.5 10.9  32.8 2053 39.2 57.8 50.5 95.1  33.3  88.7 19.6
Tamil Nadu  38.9 9316.8  74.5 23963 54.9 51.4 71.2 87.5  74.9  72.9 34.4
Tripura 2.3 69.5  49.2 2977 59.1 79.7 89.8 99.5  49.4  100.0 39.4
Uttar Pradesh  171.6 12738.9  40.3 7425 67.9 59.8 67.0 90.7  39.2  68.9 19.6
Uttaranchal 9.0 99.3  7.2 1108 51.5 76.1 60.1 96.2  7.0  98.5 9.5
West Bengal  69.2 3625.5  50.0 5237 55.9 57.7 64.5 96.9  50.1  92.6 28.0
India 893.5 112445.4  48.6 12585 65.1 57.0 69.7 83.6  46.3  58.9 23.8
Note: Far=Farmer, HH=Household, Out Amt=Outstanding Amount, Avg=Average, Rs=Indian Rupees, 
Prop=Proportion, Yr=Year, SM=Small and Marginal.  
Source: Calculated from unit level data using 33
rd Schedule, 59
th round of National Sample Survey (NSS) on Situation 
Assessment Survey of Farmers. 
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AN1  0.1  5.7 26.6  5078.5 56.6 74.0 94.2 77.3 21.2 83.5  14.1
AP1  23.5 5285.9 84.7  22522.6 61.4 30.0 62.2 86.8 83.9 69.6  20.3
AP2  23.8 5173.7 79.7  21735.1 69.1 31.5 68.3 74.8 78.2 67.1  17.9
AP3  7.7 1660.2 81.7  21586.2 64.3 32.2 64.0 58.7 80.3 41.0  21.4
AP4  5.4 2340.3 82.2  43534.1 62.5 28.7 80.7 82.8 84.6 75.9  22.4
AR1 1.2  6.1  5.9  493.4 10.6 26.9 30.2 69.4 6.1  71.8  1.9
AS1  10.6  69.7 15.6  659.5 54.5 30.8 43.0 87.9 16.5 86.2  6.4
AS2  13.3  131.8 20.3  989.6 31.8 41.5 55.4 91.0 20.0 81.2  8.0
AS3  1.2  2.0  15.8 171.9 19.9 0.0 43.0 97.8 16.1 100.0  0.0
BI1  44.1 1630.4 35.0  3694.4 47.6 42.6 78.4 94.3 36.2 92.9  13.4
BI2  26.7 1538.5 29.7  5768.1 46.5 40.7 74.1 92.0 30.0 80.7  9.5
CN1  0.0  4.0 46.4  19917.1 39.8 36.7 59.3 95.1 45.7 45.9  1.6
CT1  27.6 1137.6 40.2  4121.9 78.4 71.3 63.6 77.3 39.1 48.0  25.9
DD1  0.0  1.5 41.4  3116.5 68.4 61.4 61.7 99.0 41.5 99.1  23.1
DE1 0.1  7.6  42.9  6702.3 33.4 89.3 65.8 98.8 43.4  100.0  46.1
DN1  0.2  4.0 26.4  1735.6 49.0 51.4 84.4 93.1 24.5 87.1  15.2
GO1 0.6  7.8  6.6  1292.0 39.8 64.3 100.0 94.7 3.8  94.0  3.9
GU1  8.4  788.3 39.8  9404.2 72.7 68.9 82.6 89.3 38.0 52.1  18.9
GU2  11.2 1383.4 48.6  12348.3 67.8 58.3 73.6 87.5 46.6 60.9  18.7
GU3  5.6  928.2 50.4  16492.0 59.4 54.8 81.2 83.1 48.8 42.6  18.1
GU4  4.8  417.1 43.4  8650.3 70.9 63.3 57.7 64.2 39.4 42.5  22.8
GU5  7.8 2358.9 75.9  30206.4 85.6 81.3 49.9 47.1 63.3 21.0  45.0
HA1  10.8 2645.1 50.6  24534.2 73.4 70.1 62.9 80.9 47.6 54.2  29.3
HA2  8.7 2411.7 56.2  27839.1 64.1 64.1 58.4 70.2 51.5 49.5  34.0
HP1  9.1  871.4 33.4  9617.6 48.5 63.5 61.2 93.1 33.0 82.7  20.7
JH1  28.2  622.5 20.9  2204.6 57.3 64.1 82.4 94.7 21.0 87.5  12.9
JK1  2.1  121.7 12.4  5801.1 65.7 87.7 57.1 90.1 12.2 72.5  10.4
JK2  3.1  28.5 80.6  914.1 37.1 26.1 25.6 84.7 81.2 85.3  21.7
JK3 4.2  29.3  5.4  694.8 17.2 23.4 50.2 97.4 5.5  90.1  0.9
KA1  2.8  997.0 56.1  35708.7 78.8 91.9 90.7 88.0 54.5 87.0  51.6
KA2  7.8 1758.2 79.5  22442.5 79.1 61.3 64.1 79.3 77.5 33.6  23.2
KA3  12.7 1808.0 63.1  14201.9 65.8 41.9 67.9 87.5 64.6 72.8  23.8
KA4  17.1 2765.6 53.2  16215.5 85.1 82.8 62.2 59.8 47.7 37.1  33.5
KE1  8.3 2513.9 62.7  30130.5 48.1 88.8 71.9 95.1 62.2 88.5  55.8
KE2  13.6 4927.4 65.4  36223.7 42.3 77.7 74.8 97.7 65.7 91.3  51.5
LA1  0.0  1.1 47.3  6182.9 2.7 34.4 56.5 99.1 46.8 99.7  14.9
MA1  7.2  186.6 30.5  2587.6 69.0 69.9 72.9 92.3 29.3 74.9  20.3
MA2  20.2 4615.9 64.1  22840.7 73.4 79.4 80.1 79.1 62.1 60.3  49.0
MA3  7.1 1775.7 52.1  24961.4 80.7 85.6 64.8 68.2 45.9 43.2  41.8
MA4  13.8 2346.7 52.6  16956.0 88.8 86.4 79.4 56.5 42.6 27.5  34.4
MA5  11.5 1663.4 59.9  14482.7 85.2 83.9 59.3 49.7 48.7 29.5  43.4
MA6  6.0  583.1 51.8  9786.2 87.3 92.0 79.5 69.7 44.1 33.0  42.4
ME1  2.5  1.8  4.0 72.1 78.5 6.0 33.2 81.6 4.4 95.6  0.2
MI1  0.8  14.6 23.6  1875.7 66.5 63.6 78.2 83.7 25.1 96.8  15.8
MN1  1.0  43.4 41.1  4415.2 16.5 19.9 89.7 97.6 41.4 96.8  8.7
MN2  1.2  5.3  11.1 454.4 9.8 3.9 70.5 99.6 11.1 100.0  0.6
continued
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MP1  13.8  614.1 31.5  4442.6 61.9 56.1 83.8 70.1 27.8 45.9  13.8
MP2  11.8 1739.1 56.9  14756.5 70.6 65.3 79.9 67.6 46.1 39.5  25.9
MP3  13.5 3698.4 78.9  27385.1 62.5 42.1 78.7 66.1 76.6 40.2  27.9
MP4  10.3  659.3 32.0  6372.8 85.7 86.4 79.2 70.5 28.5 27.4  28.6
MP5  5.2  453.8 45.9  8719.9 90.8 71.4 62.2 53.7 32.6 12.4  18.3
MP6  8.5 1821.9 54.8  21330.3 75.1 61.8 74.3 64.5 51.7 49.3  28.1
NA1  0.8  8.3 36.5  1030.4 36.4 68.8 11.3 95.1 37.7 85.8  24.5
OR1  16.7 1369.7 63.0  8202.4 58.4 61.6 64.9 95.3 62.6 90.8  37.5
OR2  9.7  328.2 36.1  3399.3 90.4 90.2 86.4 86.6 33.3 63.6  31.5
OR3  16.0  787.8 39.0  4927.7 65.1 89.8 79.4 92.5 38.3 88.8  34.7
PO1  0.3  63.7 80.1  20927.5 27.6 59.6 52.6 85.6 82.0 85.6  46.0
PU1  9.9 2922.9 61.8  29451.3 64.5 50.2 35.8 83.2 58.6 33.0  25.1
PU2  8.5 4744.4 69.7  55704.8 68.1 45.9 68.1 66.9 61.5 26.7  28.2
RA1  15.3 3607.4 53.6  23523.2 62.1 33.1 80.1 28.3 54.3 14.2  9.4
RA2  20.8 4334.1 54.5  20884.0 55.2 29.9 78.3 77.2 53.7 58.6  10.9
RA3  10.2  406.3 37.6  3998.9 32.7 29.0 67.9 94.2 36.9 83.7  11.4
RA4  6.8 1404.2 65.3  20560.1 73.0 48.3 86.7 74.6 62.6 47.2  29.8
SI1  0.5  10.9 32.8  2052.5 39.2 57.8 50.5 95.1 33.3 88.7  19.6
TN1  9.7 2680.3 72.9  27738.8 51.4 54.3 71.3 90.7 70.9 74.5  38.5
TN2  10.5 2562.9 80.3  24454.5 50.3 49.2 66.3 92.3 81.0 78.1  35.1
TN3  9.8 1577.1 74.4  16012.0 45.5 36.2 65.8 87.2 76.6 87.4  26.3
TN4  8.9 2496.4 69.3  28090.5 69.1 60.3 79.4 78.9 69.7 56.8  35.6
TR1 2.3  69.5  49.2  2977.2 59.1 79.7 89.8 99.5 49.4  100.0  39.4
UP1  53.4 6858.9 53.5  12834.6 72.1 61.9 63.8 89.7 52.9 69.7  27.0
UP2  33.8 1630.1 32.6  4820.0 66.5 62.3 71.6 91.2 32.0 75.7  18.9
UP3  75.1 3120.8 33.1  4154.2 55.8 52.8 70.5 93.7 32.6 75.9  13.6
UP4  9.2 1129.1 50.6  12284.4 77.5 63.4 69.7 69.4 44.0 35.2  19.7
UT1 9.0  99.3  7.2  1108.0 51.5 76.1 60.1 96.2 7.0  98.5  9.5
WB1  6.6  168.5 29.9  2566.5 74.7 94.6 77.6 97.0 30.5 98.9  28.8
WB2  19.8  790.1 40.3  3983.9 64.9 70.3 61.5 96.4 40.6 92.6  26.9
WB3  23.1 1664.1 63.2  7213.0 53.1 48.7 60.8 97.5 63.0 89.4  29.3
WB4  19.8 1002.8 50.9  5075.1 50.5 56.7 70.9 96.6 51.0 96.8  28.7
India  893.5  112445.3 48.6  12584.8 65.1 57.0 69.7 83.6 46.3 58.9  23.8
Note and source: As in appendix 3a. Region codes as in Appendix 2b. 
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Appendix 4a 
Trends in Suicide Mortality Rates Across States, 1995-2004 (Farmer and Non-farmer Males)   
  States Farmers  Non-Farmers   
  States  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   
  Andaman  &  Nicobar  Is  0.0 54.1 80.9 74.0 60.4  107.2 20.1 46.8  6.7 20.1 54.4 54.3 50.1 46.1 54.7 39.9 46.9 50.5 40.4 44.4   
  Andhra  Pradesh  13.6 24.4 17.5 28.8 30.1 22.8 25.6 31.7 28.5 44.5 10.9 11.1 14.3 14.3 15.9 16.4 16.9 19.5 19.5 21.6   
  Arunachal  Pradesh  0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 2.3 5.2 8.8  15.2 7.2  11.3  11.0  11.7 9.9  10.2  12.2  17.6  17.1  13.0  11.1 8.1   
  Assam  4.5  2.7  7.5  5.6  2.5  4.2  5.5  9.6  6.1 12.6 14.0 19.3 21.9 20.4 18.3 19.7 17.6 14.7 15.0 15.6   
  Bihar*  1.0 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.5 1.3 1.2 1.8 2.3 2.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.9   
  Chandigarh  90.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  130.1 0.0 9.4 4.4 4.8  11.4 8.4  10.3 8.4  11.1  13.3  10.1   
  Dadra  &  Nagar  Haveli  24.2 59.1  105.5 82.1 42.0  113.1  105.1  119.6  135.1 42.5 25.2 26.5 12.2  8.5 19.6 20.6 18.0 11.5  6.8 11.8   
  Daman  &  Diu  38.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  47.6 0.0  104.3 0.0  114.6 8.9  15.0 7.8  19.1 8.2 9.0  12.1  14.7  19.2 3.0   
  Delhi  37.1 70.1 32.9  125.4 66.4 61.3 59.6  115.5 31.8 49.4 10.7  9.6 10.0  8.3  9.0  9.1 10.4  8.6  9.9 10.2   
  Goa  39.8 77.8 22.1 16.6 17.5 55.3 70.0 37.0 73.8 32.1 23.1 58.4 22.6 29.2 28.6 28.5 24.5 35.1 31.1 32.0   
  Gujarat  9.6 11.3 11.0 14.0 10.3 14.9 13.2 12.4 12.1 11.7 10.2 10.3  8.8 10.4 12.1 11.9 10.8 11.0 10.5 11.2   
  Haryana  10.1  4.9  2.5  9.2  9.4 12.0  7.2  8.9 10.1  7.5 16.1  9.8 14.1 11.7 17.4 17.2 14.9 16.5 16.2 14.5   
  Himachal  Pradesh  1.9 3.6 2.4 2.1 4.8 4.2 2.6 2.8 3.4 5.0 7.3 5.8  10.3 6.7 8.7  10.7 7.9 9.2  10.3 9.2   
  Jammu  &  Kashmir  0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 3.0 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.2 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.2   
  Karnataka  33.7 30.9 31.3 30.1 41.4 43.5 44.5 41.6 48.2 35.4 31.3 23.2 27.3 30.0 31.3 30.5 29.3 30.4 29.6 30.2   
  Kerala  127.6 109.4 138.9 172.9 182.5 184.7 161.8 258.3 297.6 183.0  35.3  35.2  39.7  40.0  42.4  40.7  43.2  42.1  39.3  41.1  
  Lakshadweep  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0   
  Maharashtra  14.7 23.5 23.9 29.0 30.6 37.3 44.1 47.3 50.8 57.2 18.0 14.6 16.5 17.0 16.3 16.5 16.5 15.8 15.7 14.5   
  Manipur  0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.3 1.8 0.9 2.7 2.3 1.0 3.1 1.9 1.6 2.9 3.2 1.9 3.3   
  Meghalaya  3.7 3.7 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.8 0.8 3.1 1.5 4.2 5.2 7.9 8.7 7.3 4.8 4.0 8.9 5.2 3.5 3.3   
  Mizoram  0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.5  11.7  13.1 8.6  26.9 8.8  15.2  16.6  18.5  13.9  16.7   
  Madhya  Pradesh*  10.5 14.4 17.9 18.4 21.8 22.1 24.3 22.5 21.2 27.7 12.1  9.6 10.6 14.4 13.3 15.6 14.2 14.5 14.3 13.5   
  Nagaland  1.9 1.8 3.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.3 7.1 1.0 1.1 4.2 3.7 2.6 2.2 3.1   
  Orissa  7.9  6.4  6.0  9.7  7.3  5.2  6.2  9.5 10.3  9.8 10.9 10.6 12.9 11.5 13.3 15.4 14.0 16.7 17.0 15.3   
  Pondicherry  0.0  0.0  291.8  1068.2  1145.1  2066.3  861.3  917.5  247.4  1495.4  108.6 81.5 75.1 53.2 67.2 36.9 55.2 73.8 81.1 47.4   
  Punjab  5.2 7.3 6.1 6.0 4.8 4.1 2.4 2.3 1.4 4.3 4.2 3.4 3.6 5.2 7.0 5.8 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.1   
  Rajasthan  0.0 6.0 8.3 8.9 8.4 7.6 6.0 6.9 7.9 9.4  13.1 7.6 7.7 8.6 9.6 8.1 8.3 8.3 9.2 8.9   
  Sikkim  0.0 11.0 24.7 21.2 22.2 11.6 22.8  7.0 27.5 40.5 25.3 29.4 10.9 29.7 32.0 21.1 24.0 24.7 23.3 12.2   
  Tamil  Nadu  NA 15.5 20.2 26.4 18.3 20.9 25.3 39.7 27.1 43.7  NA 19.9 19.2 22.4 24.4 24.2 24.7 22.1 24.0 24.8   
  Tripura  45.0 48.2  7.5 50.8 42.2  6.2 18.6 12.5  0.0  7.2 20.4 16.2 29.8 21.2 35.4 44.7 33.2 35.8 36.6 30.6   
  Uttar  Pradesh*  1.9 2.6 2.4 3.2 3.9 3.2 3.3 2.8 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.2 3.1 2.8 2.4   
  West  Bengal  18.5 26.4 25.3 20.8 18.8 21.2 20.1 25.1 20.7 18.4 20.8 21.1 20.8 21.4 21.0 19.5 19.9 17.7 18.9 19.5   





Note: Estimates for 1995 is not given for Tamil Nadu as appropriate profession wise classification is not available. * Undivided states. 
Source: Estimated using interpolated/extrapolated population using census 1991 and 2001 and suicide data from NCRB (Various Years).    
Appendix 4b 
Trends in Suicide Mortality Rates Across States, 1995-2004 (Farmer and Non-farmer Females)   
  States Farmers  Non-Farmers   
  States  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   
  Andaman  &  Nicobar  Is  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 42.8 53.0 42.5 42.8 29.4 35.8 35.4 36.3 28.6 26.4   
  Andhra  Pradesh  13.6 11.5  4.6  8.7 13.0  11.8  6.7 10.4 14.4  18.7  9.6 10.0 11.9 12.1 12.6 11.4 12.5 11.9 10.7 11.9   
  Arunachal  Pradesh  0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.1  1.4 3.5 4.2 0.7  2.7 9.0 5.1 9.5 5.8 8.8  13.9 9.8  11.6 7.9 7.6   
  Assam  0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6 1.2  1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1  1.6 7.2 9.1  10.0 9.1 8.2 8.4 7.7 7.4 8.2 7.9   
  Bihar*  0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0  0.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 2.1 2.0 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.7   
  Chandigarh  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 4.9 3.7 9.4  12.2  10.2 8.4 8.7 9.2 9.1 5.8   
  Dadra  &  Nagar  Haveli  0.0 23.9 28.7  8.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 14.6 11.3 31.4 23.4 16.4 27.2 23.9 26.9 30.9 25.1   
  Daman  &  Diu  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  13.2 8.5 8.1  11.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 3.4  10.0  12.9   
  Delhi  10.3  50.8 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  18.9  28.0 0.0  9.1 7.9 8.7 8.6 9.0 8.6 7.7 9.1 7.0 6.8 7.2   
  Goa  5.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.6  4.6  4.8 19.8 37.2 15.2 15.0 14.7 15.1 15.2 13.6 14.2 16.4   
  Gujarat  5.7 3.9 5.5 4.5 4.5  3.8 4.1 4.9 6.7  4.5  10.9  11.0  10.4  10.9  11.9  11.0  10.4 9.0 8.6 8.6   
  Haryana  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.4  1.7 1.0 1.9 1.1  1.1 9.1 5.5 7.6 7.6  10.2 8.3 8.3 7.8 7.6 7.6   
  Himachal  Pradesh  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4  0.7 6.8 5.3 7.2 6.2 7.9 7.4 8.1 7.7 8.6 7.6   
  Jammu  &  Kashmir  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4  1.4 0.5 0.2 0.5  0.0 0.6 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.5   
  Karnataka  35.3 21.7 13.9 19.0 17.2  24.8 17.2 16.7 18.3  13.9 18.6 14.5 18.0 17.8 20.8 18.6 17.0 17.5 16.1 15.9   
  Kerala  21.2 17.1 23.4 97.9 84.1  62.4 50.0 95.7 70.5  56.3 16.9 18.8 19.0 18.2 19.2 17.7 18.3 16.9 16.0 15.6   
  Lakshadweep  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0   
  Maharashtra  1.8  7.1  5.6  8.5  6.9  10.1 11.5 10.8  9.4  7.4 15.9 13.6 15.3 15.4 15.0 13.3 12.7 12.0 11.5 11.2   
  Manipur  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.9   
  Meghalaya  0.0 1.9 0.0 0.5 0.9  0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0  0.0 2.6 1.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.1 1.9   
  Mizoram  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 2.0 1.4 1.8 8.9 2.1 2.9 3.2 3.8 4.0 2.5   
  Madhya  Pradesh*  3.7  7.0 11.0  8.6  9.7  9.6  9.1  8.2  9.5  8.3 12.0 11.1 10.3 13.6 13.5 14.7 14.6 14.2 13.2 34.7   
  Nagaland  0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.8 1.7 2.0 0.8 1.4 0.9 2.6 1.3 0.8 0.9   
  Orissa  4.0  1.4  2.4  5.8  0.6  2.0  5.4  4.3  5.3  11.2 11.0 10.6 10.0 11.4 11.4 11.3 12.4 10.9 10.1  9.6   
  Pondicherry  0.0  0.0  427.7  199.4  465.1  1220.9  633.4  462.4  216.1  3285.5 48.0 50.2 44.7 44.4 51.9 41.8 44.6 33.5 41.4 36.9   
  Punjab  1.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3  0.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.5 1.1 1.2 1.2   
  Rajasthan  0.0 0.8 1.6 1.6 2.4  3.4 1.3 1.5 1.2  1.1 8.2 6.4 8.1 7.0 8.1 6.4 6.6 5.9 6.4 6.1   
  Sikkim  0.0  2.0 11.3  1.8  3.5  3.4  3.3  4.7 16.8  28.1 15.9 13.3 15.0 13.9 21.8 21.8 18.1 12.3 14.8 12.7   
  Tamil  Nadu  NA  9.5  8.8  7.0  8.4  9.3  8.6 11.2 12.9  18.6  NA 14.6 14.8 17.6 18.0 15.4 15.0 15.0 16.3 16.4   
  Tripura  131.8  123.4  0.0  128.5  0.0  0.0  0.0 15.3  4.4  0.0 11.4 11.5 27.3 14.8 32.5 28.3 29.6 20.2 25.6 24.1   
  Uttar  Pradesh*  0.4 4.0 2.8 2.7 2.5  2.7 2.0 0.9 0.7  1.4 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.9 4.0 3.2 2.6 3.0 2.5 5.3   
  West  Bengal  24.9 30.0 21.7 37.3 29.7  35.3 31.1 39.2 12.7  2.9 18.7 20.3 20.2 19.5 18.6 18.6 17.3 15.9 16.2 15.9   





Note: Estimates for 1995 is not given for Tamil Nadu as appropriate profession wise classification is not available. * Undivided states 
Source: Estimated using interpolated/extrapolated population using census 1991 and 2001 and suicide data from NCRB (Various Years).    
Appendix 4c 
Trends in Suicide Mortality Rates Across States, 1995-2004 (Age-Adjusted Population for Males and Females)   
  States Males  Females   
  States  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   
  Andaman & Nicobar Is  49.1 54.3 53.0 48.7 55.2 45.7 44.6 50.2 37.7 42.5 40.2 50.0 40.2 40.5 27.9 34.1 33.8 34.8 27.5 25.4  
  Andhra Pradesh  11.4 13.3 14.8 16.6 18.1 17.4 18.2 21.2 20.7 24.7 10.0 10.1 11.2 11.8 12.7 11.5 12.0 11.8 11.0 12.3  
  Arunachal Pradesh  7.9 8.4 9.5 7.4 9.5  14.3  14.9  13.6  10.1 8.9 5.8 3.3 6.5 3.9 6.6 9.8 7.8 9.3 5.7 6.1   
  Assam  11.5 15.1 18.4 16.9 14.6 16.2 15.0 13.7 13.2 15.0  6.3  7.9  8.9  8.1  7.4  7.7  7.1  7.0  7.8  7.4  
  Bihar*  1.2 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.0 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.4 2.0 1.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.6   
  Chandigarh  9.9  4.4  4.7 11.3  8.3 10.3  8.4 11.0 13.6 10.1  4.8  3.7  9.3 12.1 10.2  8.4  8.7  9.2  9.1  5.8  
  Dadra & Nagar Haveli  24.9 34.7 34.0 24.4 24.1 37.6 32.8 28.3 25.1 15.8  9.0 15.8 30.5 18.7 11.5 19.7 17.8 20.6 24.2 20.1  
  Daman & Diu  10.2  14.4 7.5  18.4 8.0  10.0  11.8  16.7  18.8 4.9  12.1 7.9 7.6  11.1 7.2 7.0 6.8 3.3 9.7  12.6   
  Delhi  10.9 9.9  10.1 8.9 9.3 9.3  10.6 9.0 9.9  10.3 7.9 8.8 8.6 8.9 8.6 7.7 9.1 7.0 6.8 7.2   
  Goa  24.2 59.5 22.6 28.5 28.1 29.6 26.4 35.1 32.6 32.0 18.9 35.0 14.4 14.2 14.0 14.5 14.6 13.4 13.9 16.0  
  Gujarat  10.1 10.5  9.2 11.1 11.8 12.4 11.2 11.2 10.7 11.3 10.2 10.1  9.8 10.2 11.2 10.3  9.8  8.7  8.4  8.3  
  Haryana  14.8  8.8 11.8 11.2 15.9 16.3 13.5 15.1 15.1 13.3  8.1  4.9  6.7  7.0  9.4  7.4  7.3  7.0  6.6  6.6  
  Himachal Pradesh  5.7 5.1 7.8 5.3 7.5 8.7 6.3 7.3 8.3 8.0 4.2 3.3 4.5 4.1 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.5 5.2 4.7   
  Jammu & Kashmir  0.6 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.6 1.4 2.0 1.6 1.3   
  Karnataka  31.8 24.8 28.1 30.0 33.4 33.2 32.3 32.6 33.2 31.2 20.5 15.3 17.6 18.0 20.4 19.2 17.0 17.5 16.3 15.7  
  Kerala  42.0 40.2 45.7 47.4 49.6 47.4 48.3 50.5 48.5 45.8 17.0 18.8 19.1 19.3 19.9 18.1 18.5 17.4 16.3 15.8  
  Lakshadweep  0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0   
  Maharashtra  17.4 16.0 17.7 18.9 18.5 19.6 20.6 20.3 20.6 20.3 13.6 12.6 13.8 14.4 13.9 12.9 12.6 11.9 11.3 10.8  
  Manipur  2.1 1.7 0.7 2.3 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.8 1.9 2.8 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 0.9 0.5 0.8   
  Meghalaya  4.8 6.7 6.4 5.9 3.9 3.1 6.8 4.7 3.0 3.5 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 0.9 1.5   
  Mizoram  7.8 8.7 7.1  18.0 5.9  11.1  11.3  13.4 9.5  12.0 1.2 0.9 1.2 5.7 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.6 2.7 1.7   
  Madhya Pradesh*  11.6 10.9 12.6 15.5 15.6 17.3 16.7 16.5 15.9 16.8 10.2 10.2 10.4 12.6 12.8 13.7 13.7 13.2 12.6 30.6  
  Nagaland  2.7 3.5 6.1 0.7 0.9 3.0 2.6 1.9 1.6 2.3 0.5 1.2 1.3 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.6   
  Orissa  10.1  9.6 11.3 11.1 12.0 13.3 12.4 15.4 15.7 14.4 10.3  9.8  9.4 11.0 10.7 10.8 12.0 10.5  9.9  9.7  
  Pondicherry  104. 78.9 81.6 81.2 94.7 84.7 72.7 90.6 84.2 72.0 47.6 49.8 46.9 45.2 53.6 45.8 46.2 34.5 41.7 42.3  
  Punjab  4.4 4.1 4.0 5.3 6.6 5.5 3.4 3.3 4.1 4.1 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.4 1.0 1.1 1.2   
  Rajasthan  9.1 7.1 7.9 8.7 9.3 8.0 7.6 8.0 8.9 9.0 6.0 4.9 6.4 5.6 6.6 5.6 5.2 4.8 5.1 4.8   
  Sikkim  18.0 24.2 14.7 27.3 29.3 18.5 23.7 20.0 24.4 19.5 11.7 10.3 14.0 10.7 16.9 16.8 14.1 10.3 15.3 16.8  
  Tamil Nadu  19.6 19.3 19.3 22.9 23.6 23.8 24.8 24.0 24.3 26.7 13.2 14.1 14.4 16.8 17.3 14.9 14.6 14.7 16.1 16.5  
  Tripura  24.9 21.9 26.0 26.1 36.5 38.8 31.0 32.5 31.6 27.5 20.6 19.9 25.3 22.9 30.2 26.4 27.7 19.9 24.3 22.6  
  Uttar Pradesh*  3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.8 3.9 3.1 2.5 2.8 2.4 5.0   
  West Bengal  20.4 21.9 21.5 21.3 20.7 19.7 19.9 18.6 19.1 19.3 19.0 20.6 20.3 20.1 18.9 19.1 17.7 16.5 16.1 15.5  





Note: Age-adjusted population refers to 5+ years as suicide is not medically defined for 0-4 age-group. * Undivided states. 
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